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ABSTRACT 
There already exists a body of literature that re-
lates to the reactions of small states as compared with 
the reactions of larger states. The small-state theories 
maintain that, when subjected to pressure, small states change 
their policies more quickly than larger states. One of the 
basic aims of this study is to test the validity of the 
existing small-state theories against the actual reactions 
during a specific situation. 
The major part of the study involves a detailed 
examination of New Zealand's foreign policy reactions towards 
the Middle East since the outbreak of the 4th Arab-Israeli 
War. Research indicates that New Zealand altered its 
Middle Eastern policy as a result of the oil crisis. New 
Zealand has shifted from its traditional pro-Israeli position 
to a more neutral attitude towards the Middle East conflict. 
It appears, then, that New Zealand reacted in very much the 
manner one would expect from the small-state theories. 
To be valid, however, the small-state theories should 
also be able to account for the reactions of other countries 
to the same set of variables. A comparison of the 'before 
and after' positions of twenty-five other countries indicated 
that, contrary to the small~state theories, there was no 
stron~ correlation between the size of a country and its 
vulnerability td the Arab oil-pressure. However, there 
may well have been a significant, positive correlation 
between~ high oil share.of primary energy requirements 
and vulnerability to oil-pressure. My research also 
suggests that there was an even more significant, positive 
correlation between a high level of imported Arab oil and 
vulnerability to Arab oil-pressure. 
li. 
As a result of these findings, I have formulated . 
an alternative model to account for.reactions to the Arab 
oil-crisis. I believe one must consider the oil crisis 
in terms of a bargaining game. The alternative model 
is based on two· closely related hypotheses. The first 
suggests that with an increasing dependence upon Arab oil 
. ' 
there is a greater possibility of a larger shift in policy 
when subjected to pressure from the ·Arab oil-producers. 
This is a result of the ~trong bargaining position from 
which the Arab bloc can negotiate. The allied hypothesis 
maintains that the lower the dependence on Arab oil, the 
less likelihood there is of a large shift in policy. ·The 
country under pressure in this situation has a greater 
freedom of choice as a result of the weaker Arab bargaining 
positi·on. 
iii. 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE PAGE 
1. Relative share of the New Zealand 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5, 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
energy n1arket . ..................... . 
New Zealand's energy requirements .. 
Consumption of motor spirit ....... . 
Motor spirit usage as a proportion of 
total petroleum usage .............. · 
Origin of New Zealand's oil imports 
World oil production .............. . 
Proven reserves of oil ............ . 
Oil price increases ............... . 
Quarterly imports of crude petroleum 
Value of imports of mineral fuels, 
lubricants, and related materials .. 
22 
25 
26 
.27 
27 
33 
33 
39 
51 
53 
11. New Zealand's overseas exchange 
12. 
12(a) 
13. 
transact ions . ..................... . 56 
Values of exports of New Zealand produce 
to Middle Eastern countries........ 57 
Size classification of states...... 99 
Comparative foreign policy positions 100 
14. Oil's role in the various energy economiesl02 
15. The presence of Arab oil-pressure ... 103. 
16. Correlation of size, policy change, and 
oil-pressure .. ..................... ~- 105 
Correlation of oil's share of primary 
energy requirements, policy change, and 
oil-pressure ... .................... . 106-107 
18. Correlation of the level of imported oil,. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
policy change, and oil-pressure..... 107 
Correlation of the level of imported 
OAPEC oil supplies, policy change, and 
oil-pressure .. ..................... . 
Distribution of oil consumption.~~.~· 
'Oil saving capacity' .............. . 
109 
125. 
125 
iv. 
FIGURE PAGE 
1. Strategic interaction model 
(a) Friendship effect of the oil 
weapon . .................. ·. . . 111 
(b) Direct effect of the oil 
weapon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 
(c) Filtered effect of the oil 
weapon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 
2. Tentative model for reactions to the 
oil crisis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ·123 
v. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I wish to thank my research supervisors Richard 
Kennaway and Dr R6n Macintyre for their full and construct-
. .. 
ive criticism of earlier drafts of my work, and other 
members of the University of Canterbury Political Science 
Department who have made h~lpful comments. I would also 
•. 
like to acknowledge the help received from the Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs a~d Energy Resources. Likewise I 
am grateful to Anne McAuley and Barry Angus for their 
patient proof reading of various stages of my research. 
The defects which remain are my own responsibility. ·r 
am grateful also to the typists, Olga and Fran for the 
typing of this paper. 
Christchurch 
New Zealand. 
February 1975. 
M.H.McKAY 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
The subject of this dissertation is 'New Zealand and 
the oil crisis ·- an examination of foreign policy reactions. ' 
The study examines New Zealand's. foreign policy reactions 
towards the Middle East situation, especially since the out-
break of the 4th Arab=Israeli war and the ensuing oil crisis. 
I will seek to establish whether or not New Zealand's 
foreign policy was influenced by the oil crisis. I will 
then match New Zealand's reactions against small~state 
theory. As a further test of the small~state theory I will 
examine the reactions of some .other selected states to the 
same situation. The basic aim of the .study, then, will be 
to test the validity of the existent small-state theory 
against the actual reactions duri~g a specific situation, 
namely, the international oil crisis. 
This. raises the problem .of definitions. There are 
almost as many different ~efinitions of a small state as 
there are small-state theorist.s. 1. However, for the 
purpose of this study, I will adopt David Vital's definition 
.of a small state. This definition states that "the small 
power ... is one which is neither a 'pawn', in the sense that 
its policy is one predominantly determined by others for 
/ purposes extrinsic to it; nor a protege or client or 
satellite, in the sense that it is not materially free to 
enter into definable relationships with more than one of the 
primary powers .... It is an autonomous political ·entity and 
.. • .. its. contingent attributes are subject to. visible and 
rapid variation. . • . (It) ·is one which is free to reverse 
such political ties as it may have when its intrinsic 
~ ... -. 
interests so dictate, ... but it obviously differs from the 
primary power in its ability to sustain the effort to induce 
cha!lge in the structure of international relations. 11 2. 
The use of the word crisis also presents some defin-
itional problems. The tighter definitions maintain that a 
crisis decision is a response to a high threat to values, 
either immediate or long range, with little time for 
decision under conditions of surprise .. 3. Alternatively, 
looser definitions see a crisis as merely some kind of 
boundary or turni!lg point. 4. Whereas some theorists main-
tain that, by definition, a crisis is a short time concept, 
I do not think it inconceivable to define a crisis as a 
time of difficulty or danger over a period of time. For 
the purposes of this study, an international crisis will be 
defined as a set of rapidly unfolding .events which raise 
the impact of destabilizing forces in the general inter-
national system. It is in this sense that the term 1 the 
oil crisis' will be. used. The oil crisis will be taken to 
mean the restriction of production by most of the Arab oil-
producing states (with the notable exception of Iraq) and 
the increase in the price of oil in the last quarter of 
1973 as a result of the quadrupli!lg of the return to the 
producer states, together with the repercussions of these 
two events. 
The dissertation will concentrate. on. fore~gn policy 
reactions to the oil crisis. Definitions of foreign policy 
aboun.d, 5, but I will use the definition of. foreign policy 
as the art by which a. government ascertains the state 1 s 
rights, obligations, interests, and responsibilities in 
' 
international relations; and makes decisions in order to 
protect those rights, observe those obli~ations, promote 
those interests, and discharge those responsibilities. 
Several considerations often underlie theoretical 
.3 
work.s. One of these considerations is that some rec0gnizable 
pattern '.Of repeatable or characteristic behaviour does occur 
within the international system. If one is trying to 
establish the wider significance of any event then one must 
be able to reco.gnize_ generalized pat~ern.s. · While each and 
every situation may· be unique when all its properties are 
.c_onsidered, one must be prepared to establish certain 
similarities· in certain situations. Man would be. unable to 
.. cope with his daily existence if he did not treat most new 
situations as. comparable to some situations he has met or 
learned about in the pa.st. . For purposes of .evaluation and 
action, all humans cat.egorize .events according to a limited 
number of properties and ignore the rest. A second under-
lying theme is that international patte.rns ·of behaviour are 
related, in ways that can _be specified, to. the character-
istics of the entities participating and to. the. functions 
.they perform. These two themes are the pillars upon which most 
most of the theory on the. foreign policy behaviour of small 
.states is built. 
One of the most challenging of recent. fields of 
speculation h~s been the. foreign policy behaviour of small 
states. The categorization of .states accordi!lg to size 
has lo!'."J.g been part of world politics. Recently, however, 
the concept of size has received an increased amount of 
attention as a factor affecting foreign policy. As a 
result there has been a renewed interest in the. foreign 
policy of small states. 6. From readi!lg the literature on 
small states it appears that there are almost as many 
different definitions of a small state ~a there are 
theorists. However, .it is possible to abstract a_ general 
model of small .states behaviour in. fore~gn affairs .. 7. 
Based on the d.efining characteristics usually one. or more 
of· 1) Small land area 
2) Small total population 
. 3) Small total GNP (or other measure of total 
productive capacity), and 
4) A low level of military capabilities small 
states are traditionally depicted as exhibiti~g certain 
foreign policy behaviour patterns when compared to large 
states. These are: 
(~) low levels of overall participation in world 
affairs; 
(b) h~gh levels of .activity in inte.rgovernmental 
organizations (IGO's); 
(c) h~gh levels of support for international 
l~gal norms; 
(d) .avoidance of the use of force as a technique 
of statecraft; 
(e). .avoidance of behaviour and policies which 
tend to alienate the more powerful states in the system; 
~( f) a narrow. functional and. geographical ra~ge 
of .concern in. foreign policy activities; 
.Cg) . frequent. utilization of moral and normative 
.pos.itions or int@rnational issues. Thes~ character-
is tics are by no me ans universally accepte.d, .8, but are 
the ~esults of a. general overview of the small state 
theorists. 
At a more specific level, the. various hypotheses 
expounded by the small state theorists. can be subdivided 
into three categories. The first of ~hese categories 
relates to the size differential of small states as 
compared .to larger states. The. general tone of these 
LI 
'size vulnerability' hypotheses is that small states are 
more vulnerable to crisis, primarily because of their size. 
"Smallness, however elusive and hard .to. define, is one of 
the key factors in (a crisis) situation because it does 
seem that to be at the low end of the scale of nations 
means a vulnerability. to crises and pressures that larger 
countries can shr:ug .off or overcome. 11 .9. Vital, one of 
the more prominent small-state theorists, reinforces this 
hypothesis when he states that "a small .state is .more 
vulnerable .to pressure, more likely to. give way under 
.stress, more limited in respect pf the political options r 
open to it and subject to a t~ghter connection between 
domestic and external affairs." 10. 
Closely related to the 'size. vulnerability' hypo-
theses are the . 'economic. vulnerability' hypotheses. 
While this. group of hypotheses does not disr~gard 
physical size as an important factor in the. fore~gn 
policy of small states, the emphasis is placed more on 
.economic rather than physical ...vulnerability. The. general 
tone of these hypotheses is that small .states are, usually, 
not only economically dependent upon the larger, 
industrialized .states but are also less able to withstand 
external pressures on their economies from, for example, 
a short~ge of international reserves, or the terms of an 
economic ~greement. It is a~gued that small states have 
a greater reliance on foreign trade, a greater 
.concentrati.on of their exports in a limited number of 
markets, and a lesser diversification in the range of 
commodities exported, and that this means small .states are 
.-
generally more specialized and vulnerable than their 
la~ger counterparts. 1.1. 
As Vital puts it, uthe . .vulnerability of the small .power to 
pressure which exploits its heavy dependence on fore~gn 
trade and on foreign sources of str.ategic supplies is an 
inescapable conseq.uence .of limited economic resources. 11 12. 
Most sma.11.-state theorists also rec.ognize the 
pr~sence of various other factors c;uch as. the level of 
social development" ge~graphical location, the surrounding 
international environment, the cohesion of the population, 
and the. degree of internal support. given the. government) 
hut .they usually r~g8:rd either size. or economic 
.vulnerability (or a combination of both) as the key 
factors accounti~1g for the fore~gn policy behaviour of 
small states .. 
It is fairly clear, then, that the bulk of the 
- . 
literature emphasizes the . .vulnerability of· sinall states to 
press tire, and that small .states pursue policies which try 
to .avoid such pres.sur.e • Given this . .vulnerability, it 
. follows that, in times of pressure, .small states will 
capitulate more readily than la!'ger state.s. It is this 
point which will be. under scrutiny in the following 
researc.h. The theory s~ggesta that as small states have 
certain characteristics, these same characteristics 
determine the reactions of small .states. Assuming this 
to be. correct, then, it seems perfectly reasonable to 
expect New Zealand's fore~gn policy reactions to the oil 
crisis to be accounted for by the small-st.ate theory. 
This will be the major part of the study. To be. valid, 
however, the small-state theory model must also account 
for the reactions of other small (and, by implication, 
la!'ge) states to the same set of variables - the .outbreak 
pf the 4th Arab-Israeli war and the ensuing oil crisis. 
6 
If the. foreign policy reactions of other states to the 
same situation are in accordance with the small~state 
model then added weight will be lent to that model. If, 
however, some discrepancies occur then the model must 
either be adjusted or reconstructed. 
1). See R.O. Keohane, 'Lilliputian Dilemmas: Small 
states in International Politics', in International 
.Organization, vol.24, 1969, p.296; R.P. Barston,, 'The 
External Relations of Small States' ,,in A. Schou and 
, 7 
A. Brundtland, Small States in International Relations, 
(Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell, 19.71), p.40; D •. Vital, 
The Inequality of States, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 19£7), 
p •. 8. 
· 2) D. Vital, 'The Analysis of Small Power Politics', 
in Schou and Brundtland, op.cit., pp. 19-20: .• 
. 3) See G. Pa;i_ge, 'The Korean Decision', in J.N. 
Rosenau, International Politics and Foreign Policy, (New 
York, The Free Press,. 196g) • 
. 1J.) See K. E .. Bouldi!J.g, and .A. Wiener and H. Kahn, as 
quoted by C.F. Hermann, 'International Crisis as a 
situational variable', in J .N. Rosenau, on. ci.t., .P. La2. 
5) See J. Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy, (New 
Yo_rk, Oxford University Press, 1968); W. Wallace, 
.Foreign Policy and the Political Process, (London, 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1~71); and J.N. Rosenau, 6p.cit. 
6) Recent books. focusing on the. foreign policy 
behaviour of small states include, D. Vital, The 
Inequality of States, (Oxford, Clare.ndon Press, 1967); 
-~--------· ... 
B. Benedict (ed.), Problems of Smaller Territories, 
(London, Athalone Press, 1967); A. Andrew, Defense by 
_Qther M_~, (Ontario, Deyell Lt.d., 1970); .A . .Schou and 
A. Brundtland, (eds.), .Small States in International 
Relation_s, (Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell, 1971); D. 
Vital; The Survival of Small States, (London, Oxford 
·university Press, 1971), and R. Barston (ed), The 0th.er 
Jowers, (tondon, George Allen and Unwin, 1973) . 
. 7) M. East abstracts this. general model of small state 
theory in tSize and Foreign Policyt, in World Politics, 
July, 1973,. vol.25, no.4, p.557 . 
· B) See East, _op. cit., pp. 556-576, for criticisms of 
some of these characteristics .. 
9) D.P.J. Wood, 'The Smaller Territories: some 
Political Considerationst, in B. Benedict, Problems of 
Smaller Territories, (London, The Athalone Press, 
University of London, 1967), p •. 32. 
10.). D .• Vital, The Inequality of States, (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1967), p .. J . 
. 11). Se~ R. Barston, tThe External Relations of Small 
States t,. in Schou and Brundtland, op. cit. 
12.). D .. Vital, The Inequality of States, p..112. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
(I) THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
9 
After the second World War New Zealanders looked to 
a post-war era, in which the United Nations would secure 
and preserve world peace. This was a hope cherished by 
Peter Fraser, the New Zealand Prime Minister from 1940 
to 1949. Although he was an early opponent of the League 
of Nations, which he considered a league of victors, Fraser 
later became an ardent champion of the League. When, 
during the second World War, consideration was being given 
to the formation of a new international institution Fraser 
had his owh ideas ·on its structure. While the UN did not 
totally match Fraser's concept, New Zealand still gave the 
UN its support. Since that time New Zealand has played a 
very active role in the UN. 
There is no need to recall the events of the second 
World War in this study. It is important, however, to 
recall some of the immediate post-war feelings in order 
to place New Zealand's foreign policy reactions into 
perspective. During the second World War, Hitler pursued 
a fanatical anti-Semitic policy which had the overall effect 
of eliminating some six million Jews. 1. Naturally enough, 
this policy was abhorrent to the rest of the world and, 
after Germany's defeat, there was a considerable worldwide 
feeling in favour of those Jews who had managed to escape 
Hitler's wrath. 
New Zealand's Prime Minister Fraser certainly had 
no doubts that the creation of a Jewi~h.State was 
t"":'._. 
essential. Along with some of the other Allied leaders 
he had visited the German concentration camps and this 
had confirmed hj.s own strong feelings of sympathy towards 
' 10 
the Jews. 
When Britain relinquished her mandate in Palestine 
the problem was handed over to the UN to solve. The 
United Nations set up a UN Special Committee on Palestine 
(UNSCOP} composed of representatives of eleven member 
. . ., . 
states .. 2. The Committee was unanimous in its 
recommendation of independence for Pa~estine but divided 
upon th~ structure require~. The majority. recommended 
that there should ~e a political partition, with ·a Jewish 
state and an Arab ·state, within an economic union; .the 
minority favoured a single federal state. The Jewish 
Agency accepted the partition plan as the 'indispensable 
minimum'; the· Arab. governments and the Arab.Higher 
Executive rejected it .. 3. 
New Zealand took the view that the UN must have 
r~gard for the means of implementation of its plan and 
make provision for the consequences which would 
inevitably follow partition. As the proposals put to. the 
Assembly did not contain any such provisions, New Zealand 
.abstained on the. vote in corrnnittee. 4. Subsequently, 
however, in the General Assembly, New Zealand decided to 
support partition, which was approv.ed on 29 November, 1947, 
by. 33 votes to 13, with 10 abstentions. The two.-thirds 
majority included the United States and the S.oviet Union, 
but not Bri tai.n . .5. The Assembly's decision was then 
accepted by the Jews but. denounced by the. Arab.s. 
New Zealand's next action ca.me at the. UN special 
session in March, 1948. At this session the. United 
States tried to backtrack. from its earlier position of 
support for the partition plan. 11 T.rwnan did have a 
passing moment pf indecision, in March 1948, when the 
.. ll 
. gravity of the situation in Europe and the .outcry raised by 
the American Ambassadors in the Arab countries moved him to 
renounce the partition plan and propose international 
control over Palestine. This was also due in part to the 
fears for the safety of the new state entertained by 
friends of the Jews, forseeing the imminent Arab attack". 
· 6. The American proposal would have seen Palestine 
administered by the UN as a trust territory. This 
suggestion brought a .strong protest from New Zealand's 
representative, Sir Carl Berends en. He dismissed the idea 
of trusteeship and the resolution proposi.ng i.t. He 
argued that if partition was right in N.ovember 1947, then 
it was .still right. "When Berends en sat. down, the 
American trusteeship idea was deadn ... 7. 
On 15 May, 1948, Israel was invaded by armies from 
Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. In the fighti~g 
Israel won some of the land allotted to the Arab State 
under the UN partition plan of 1-).47, but lost territory 
on the west bank of the River Jordan to Jordan, and the 
Gaz.a strip to Egypt. New Zealand expressed r~gret .at the 
Ol..tbreak of war and Prime Minister Fraser, speaking to the 
General Assembly, "appealed to Arabs and Jews. to accept 
the existing situation, and to negotiate in an impartial 
spirit uninfluenced by past animosities, the alternative 
to which, he said, could lead only to the. destruction of 
both peoples". 8. On 29 January, 1949, the New Zealand 
Government granted de. facto recognition to the Government 
. . ' 
of Israel. Mr. Fraser said that the. grant of recognition 
by the New Zealand Government was a l~gf~al development of 
New Zealand's support for the General Assembly's 
12 
resolution of November, 1947, recommending the 
establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. 9. 
New Zealand's next notable UN vote was over the issue 
of Israel's admission to memb~rship of the UN. A resolution 
calling for Israel's membership of the UN was presented to the 
General Assembly on 11 May, 1949. New Zealand supported 
Israeli membership along with the US and the Soviet Union, 
with Britain abstaining. 10. Following approval of the 
application by the Security Council on 4 March, Israel was 
admitted to the UN by the General Assembly on 11 May,1949. 
New Zealand's main Middle Eastern activity between 
1949 and 1956 was as a contributor to the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the ~ear 
East,(UNRWA). However, New Zealand's aid contribution to 
the Middle East consisted of little more than token aid to 
Palestinian refugees and a number of UN Observers for trouble 
spots in the region. 
In 1956 Suez Crisis saw New Zealand involved in the 
Middle East again. It is not necessary, here, to go into the 
full details of the Suez Crisis. 11. However, the immediate 
cause was the American announcemen.t, on 19 July, that they 
were no longer offering large-scale economic aid to Egypt 
for the Aswan Dam Project. Egypt's President Nasser had 
attached great importance to this project and on 26 July 
he took his own measures. He nationalized the Universal 
Maritime Suez Canal Company, the international company 
responsible for operating the Suez Canal. He claimed that the 
revenues received from operating the Suez Canal would pay the 
expenses of constructing the Aswan Dam. ·,This Egyptian control 
. ~ . ~ ~ . . 
over one of the world's most important waterways caused 
alarm among the larger world powers. Once 
peaceful efforts to 'rectify' the situation had failed, the 
use of force became an obvious alternative. 
On 29 October,1956, Israeli. forces .attacked ~gypt, 
who had refused to allow Israeli ships to use the. canal 
since 1951. It is now. generally tho~ght that there was 
some deg.ree of coil us ion between Israel, France, and 
13 
Britain before the attack. 12. rn·any event, the reaction 
.of'. the US Gov'ernment was quite. different from that of the 
British and.French: The US r-eaction was to. condemn 
Israel as tl1e aggressor and to insist on Israeli .withdrawal; 
the British and French forces attacked ~gypt. The 
British and Freneh j u.stified their actions on the. grounds 
that it was essential to ensure there should not be a 
military. vacuum in the Suez Canal area pending the creation 
of the. United Nations. forc.e. By the end .of November, 
United Nations forces had started ·to ar~ive, and in early 
· December the British and French agreed to withdraw their 
troops by the end of the year. The Egyptian authorities 
r.efused to have the canal cleared until the last British 
and French troops had left. It was then cleared, under 
the .auspices of the. UN, and reopened for traffic on 9 April 
1957. On 2ll April, Egypt made a declaration that it would 
maintain. free and uninterrupted nav~gation of the Canal for' 
all nations. It did so as r~gards Israel until February 
19.5.9. 
At this point of time New Zealand's two ~ajar allies 
were Britain and the. United States, and the success of New 
Zealand's. fore~gn policy was. greatly dependent on 
harmonious relations between these two powers. Although 
British by des cent and strongly tied .to.~.~_he 'Mother Country' 
by both trade and sentiment, New Zealanders were neverthe-
less keenly aware of the strat~gic importance of the 
United States. 
14 
When faced with the dilemma of an open divergence between 
British and American policies, New Zealand chose to follow 
the dictates of tradition, sentiment and a somewhat dis-
torted perception of its own vital interests. 13. 
When the crisis broke in July, New Zealand's Prime 
Minister, Sidney Holland, was in the United States on his 
way back to New Zealand from attending a Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers' Conference in London. His immediate reacti.on 
was to assure British Prime Minister Eden that New Zealand 
approved the British and French military preparations, and 
would stand by Britain "through thick and thin". 14. 
Holland informed the House of Representatives that his 
justification for this policy was that the Suez Canal was 
vital to Britain, and Britain was vital to New Zealand; 
and, if necessary therefore, as he hinted, New Zealand was 
prepared to support Britain with force.15. However, 
when Israel invaded Egypt on 29 October, Holland's mood 
was one of instinctive disapproval. He suggested that 
Israel's action had increased Arab-Israeli tension to 
dangerous proportions, that acts of planned retaliation 
were self-defeating, and that aggression could not be 
condoned. 16. When the split between the British and 
American policies became apparent the New Zealand 
Government found itself in a dilemma. 
In the weeks that followed, Holland was less than 
wholehearted in his support for the British policy. He 
gave his support to the British motives but carefully 
avoided discussing the British methods. 17. Yet despite 
its own misgivings, New Zealand maintain~~ its traditional 
position and stood by Britain in the United Nations, 
supported at times by only France, Israel and Australia. 
On 2 November the UN General Assembly adopted 
a resolution (a similar resolution had been vetoed by 
Britain and France in the Security Council) urgi~g the 
Israelis and the Egyptians to agree to an immediate cease-
fire, and that all other nations refrain. from intervention 
by force. This resolution was adopted by 64 votes to 5 
(Australia, France, Israel, .New Zealand, United Kingdom). 
On L[ November, New Zealand abstained. from a resolution 
setting up a United Nations For·ce which was adopted by. 57 
votes to O, with 19 abstentions. 18. Following .that 
resolution wa.s a second one calling for an immediate cease--
fire, which New Zealand, Australia, France, Britain and 
Israel alone oppos~d. Three days later, on 7 November, 
another resolution calling. for a withdrawal of Israeli, 
British> and French. fore.es was passed by 65 votes to 1 
(Israel), with 10. .abstentions (includi!lg Australia, France 
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New Zealand, and the. United. Ki!1gdom). A further resolution 
cal.li!J.g for similar measures was adopte.d on 24. November with 
New Zealand, ?-gain in the minority of: five, opposing the 
resolution. On. 3 December Britain. finally yie.lded to 
Assembly pressure and announced that she would begin to 
' . 
wi thd.raw her. forces. from the Canal Zone immediately. 
While the .effects of New Zealand's support for 
Britain were not particularly sever.e, .1.9, New Zealand was 
obviously relieved to have the whole a.ffair concluded. 
New Zealand's support .. for Britain (and, indirectly, for 
1srael) during the Suez Crisis certainly cha!lged ·the. focus 
of New Zealand's. fore~gn .policy. No longer did New 
Zealand adopt the 'where.-Bri tain goes, we. go' attitud.e. 
In addition the Middle East. ceased tQ b~ an area pf great 
···-. . 
interest. for New Zealand's .foreign policy makers, and, 
during the ten or so years until the 3rd Arab-Israeli war 
in 1967, New Zealand adopted a low profile in the area. 
New Zealand~ how.ever, did not abandon its tacit .support 
for· the State. of Israel. 
The hostility between the Arab states and Isra.el 
which had caused war in 1948 and 1956, intensified once 
again from 1965 onwards as a result of raids by Arab 
guerilla groups across the borders of IsraeJ. With the 
establishment, in Pebruary 1966, of a Baathist 
government in Syria which made no secret of its support 
for the most prominent of the. guerilla. groups, Al Fatah, 
the raids on Israel became heavier and more ambitious in 
scop.e. The pressure had mounted considerably by 196.7. 
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On 14. May, 1967, ~gypt put its armed forces on the alert 
and moved army formations towards the border 'in support 
of Syriq.' . As they reached the border Nasser ordered the 
UN forces to leave Sinai and his. forces took up their 
battle positions. Then, on 22 May, Nasser blocked the 
Gulf of Aqaba, thereby. cutting off the Israeli port of 
Eilat. Then, in the. face of the. Arab military 
preparations, Israel launched, on 5 June, a 'pre-emptive' 
attack on the Arab states. Israel inflicted quick and 
severe damage on the Arabi::. 
At the request of the Soviet. Union, an emergency 
session of the UN General Assembly opened on 17 June and 
lasted until 18 September. From 19 to. 30 .June, sixty-· 
nine delegations participated in the General Assembly 
debate on the situation in the Middle East. 
The New Zealand spokesman, F.H. Corner, spent most 
of his speech attacking the Savi.et Union which he said had 
a "heavy responsibility for this confli.ct". 20. He said 
that the basic condition. for a return to stability was 
the acceptance of the existence of Israel. 
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He also outlined. Israel's. respons:Lbility to withdr·aw. from 
the occ.upied territories, but only in the .context .of a 
settlement which would. guarantee security to both Israel 
and its neighbours. He. did riot make it clear exactly 
which .terr:ltori~s Israel· should withqraw from, and made no 
specific reference to the Palestinian .refugees, although he 
did briefly mention Israel's responsibility to prevent th~ 
creation of' a. new refugee proble.m. 2 .. 1." 
The Assembly· failed to adopt any of the four res-
olutions proposed hy the S.oviet. Union,. Yl1gos1avia, .Albania, 
and the Latin American state;s. These four resolutions all 
either condemned Israel and/or called for an Israeli 
withdrawal from 'occ.upied' .territorie.s·. New Zealand 
reaffirmed its pro-Israeli posi.tion ·and, alo~g with Israel, 
the Un:;L ted. Kingdom, the United States, and Australia, voted 
against all four resolution.s. By this stage, under the 
leaciership of General de Gaulle, .France had moved away from 
a policy of support for Israel in favour .of a more pro-Arab 
stance, and voted in favour of the Yl1goslavian resolution 
but abstained from the .other three ·resolution.s. Two · 
resolutions calling upon Israel to desist from meas1ires· in 
Jerusalem prejudicial to an .eventual determination of its 
status were, however, passe.d. 
of these resolutiotis. 
New Zealand voted in. favour 
Afte~ further months .of strenuous. diplomacy inside 
and outside the. United Nations, the Security Council 
adopted, on 22 November, a. British compromise· resolution 
calling for an Israeli withdrawal from occupied territorie·s; 
an end to the Arab .state .of war with :ts~ael; respect for 
the territorial integrity of all states in the area; a 
just settlement of the Palestinian ref~1gee· problem; and 
.18 
freedom of navigation in the international waterways. 2.2. 
New Zealand has also adopted this resolution as the basis 
for any future settlemen.t. This has not, however, 
provided a clear cut basis for the solution of the Middle 
East co;nflict. In. fact, both sides in the conflict have 
given SC 242 their own interpretation, and peace has not 
.eventuated. New Zealand, while supporting the use of SC 
242 to resolve the conflict, has tended to lean towards 
the Israeli interpretation of SC 242. 
New Zeala__r1d' s position at this· stage was .still one 
pf maintaining a low profile in the area. Trade between 
New Zealand and the Middle East was rather low-key also, 
although in 1964 a trade commissioner opened an office in 
Athens and included in his responsibilities all Middle East 
.countries as far as Iran. Governmental contacts were. very 
limited at this st?-ge, although the Israeli ambassador in 
Canberra was accredited to New Zealand in 1567. 
The period from 1967 to 1973 saw a situation of 'no 
peace, no war 1 existing in the Middle Eas.t. Israel 
retained most of the territories occupied in 1967 and the 
A;:•ab states remained in a state of disarray following their 
defeat in the 1967 conflic.t. Meanwhile the Palestinian 
· r.efugees remained homeless, and became even more. desperate. 
Aware that their people were unable to prevail .over the 
Israelis when employing the tactics .of conventional. guerilla 
warfare, the new. generation of Palestinians shifted to 
tactics pf terror. Israeli people and their supporters 
.everywhere bec2111e .the targets of Palestinian vengeance. 
Fo1' example, Black September, an organiz'ation of ultra-
militant Palestinians, executed the Israeli athletes at 
Munich, murdered three Western diplomats at Khartoum in 
March, 197 3, hijacked a Japan Air Lines Jumbo Jet with 1L15 
people aboard in July, 1973, and have carried out a varied 
programme of similar operations since they first gained 
notoriety with the assassination of the Jordanian Prime 
Minister, Wasfi Tal, at Cairo in November, 1971. Not 
surprisingly, Israel has not just accepted these events; 
Israel has adopted a strategy of retaliatory terror. 
What has resulted is a cycle of terror and counter-terror.23. 
New Zealand is well out of the Middle Eastern fire-
line, and had few direct dealings with the main belligerent 
states during this period. Rather than becoming involved 
in an area where it could have little, if any, influence, 
New Zealand maintained its low profile on Middle Eastern 
matters. Even so, sympathies certainly seemed to lie 
with the Israelis. The press, radio, and television more 
often than not reflected pro-Israeli positions. While it 
is true that much of New Zealand's news material came from 
international news agencies which operated out of Israel, 
the passive acceptance of this pro-Israeli leaning was in 
keeping with many of the rather unflattering attitudes 
towards the Arabs - witness the car sticker 'Save fuel, 
burn an Arab'. 
New Zealand was starting to become more interested 
in the Middle East as a trading area by the early 1970's. 
It soon became evident that the Middle East was far too large 
an area for New Zealand's trade ambassador in Athens to 
cope with. In 1970, therefore, responsibility for the 
countries bordering on the Gulf was transferred to the 
trade commissioner in New Delhi, and since that time both 
trade commissioners have undertaken a number of surveys in 
their respective areas. 24. Private ~omfuercial interest 
was also on the increase during this period and producer 
board representatives and other New Zealand exporters 
visited the area. In particular a Manufacturers' 
Federation trade mission went there in 1970. 
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Diplomatic activity was. very limited, but ~gypt did 
accr~di.t its Ambassador in Canberra. to cover New Zealand. 
Thi~ happened in 1970, three years after the accreditation 
. of the Israeli Ambassador to .. New Zealand. 
Another interesting point to note here· concerns New 
Zealand's domestic pol1ti.cal scene, and part.i.cularly the 
New Zealand Labour Pa.rty. In Israel it. has been the 
Mapai., or Israeli Labour Party, in coalition with a 
. varyi~g array of smaller parties, which has formed the 
government ever since independence, and which has occupied 
the most important positions in the_ government, ·including 
the p~emiership and the ministries of foreign affairs and 
.of. defence. 25. The New Zealand Labour Party has 
traditional links with the Labour Party in Israel and most 
Labour Party members who have travelled overseas in recent 
years have includ~d in their itineraries a visit to Israel. 
In addition, the rather small Jewish community in New 
Zealand has traditionally. given its support to the New 
· Zealand Labour Party. M.r. Kirk admitted the. close link 
between the New Zealand Labour Party and the Israeli Labour 
Party during the 1974 parliamentary debate on the Estimates 
of Fore~gn Affairs expenditure. 26. 
That, then, is the political background in which New 
Zealand's attitude~ towards the Middle East and the oil 
~risis must be considered. New Zealand supported the 
creation pf the Jewish state of Israel; ~upported Israeli 
membership of the. Uni.ted Nations; al~_gned its elf with Israel, 
Australia, France, and the Unj_ted Kingdom during the 1956 
Suez Crisis; and tacitly supported Israel in the 1967 war. 
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After 1956 New Zealand adopted a low prpfile in Middle East 
matters, although, both in the UN and at home, it maintained 
.its pro-Israeli sympathies. The Middle East was pf little 
real inter·est to New Zealand trade by early 1973, and New 
Zealand had no diplomatic representation in the area, altho~gh 
both Israel and ~gypt had Ambassadors accredited to New 
. Zealand. On the domestic .political scene the New Zealand 
Labour Party, with its. strong traditional links with the 
ruling Israeli Labour Party, was elected to office in 
December, 1972. 
(II) ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
The .supply of energy is a fundamental part of the 
way of life in a developed count:r'Y such as New Zealand, 
where the ability and freedom to satisfy. desires. for 
material. goods and bodily comforts are enjoy~d. Ene~gy 
not only provides a home with heat and l~ght, but as a 
resource it is a basic input in all of the. goods and 
services which are used, either as the ene~gy. component or 
as a raw material. Because of its natural advantages New 
· Zealand has_ grown accustomed to plentiful supplies of 
ene~gy at relatively. cheap prices and in convenient, forms. 
Over. the years a particular type of ene~gy market has 
.. developed in New Zealand - a market with some unique 
characteristics which i.n turn create .their. own unique 
prob lerr:,s. 
Electricity's. role is now well established in New 
· Zealan.d. The post-war period has seen s~gnificant changes 
in the pattern of New Zealand's energy. ·consumption. In 
the period between 1954 and 1974 electricity. virtually 
doubled its share of the New Zealand energy marke.t 
(Table 1)~ Householders have shown an increasipg tendency 
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to turn to the comfort and cleanli.ness of electricity .for 
their heating and cooking requirements. and the domestic 
sector now accounts. for about 47%· of ~lectricity. generate.do 
2:7 o This increasing irnportanc.e of electricity in the 
development cf· New Zealand's energy .·resour.ces in the past 
two decades reflects the suitability or' many areas of New 
··Zealand for hydro-electric development'. The.many rivers 
Table· 1 · 
Relative Share of the Energy Market Occupied by Coal, 
Hydro-Electricity, Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Primary Energy ·1924 1934. 1944 1954 19.64 1974 
Coal 93% 72% 66% 47% . 35% 17% 
Hydro-electricity 1% . 4% ; 7% ·. 10% 15% 18% 
Petroleum 6% . 24% 27% 42% 50% 62% 
Natural Gas . 3% 
Sour•ce: The Coal Industry of New Zealand, (Welli~gton, 
Government White Paper, 19.T4:). · 
have ensured a constant supply of naturally replenished 
fuel, .while numerous lakes have been .available .for 
stor?_ge. It is not surprisi~g, then, .with thes·e· resources 
that New Zealand has developed an extensive hydro-electric 
system, and the Government has been able to make 
electrici.ty available on a nationwide basi:s. 
Zealand's hydro resources are finite and inevitably all of 
the hydro potential that is acceptable for development will 
eventually be utilized. This may well nece~sitate th~ 
_,.,.·-. 
need to turn to thermal generation which so ~ar has only 
been exploited to a very limited extent. ~8. 
As Table 1 indicate~, in the e~rly days of Ne~ 
Zealand's development. coal was the major ene~cgy resource. 
Coal maintained its predominance right up to 1950, when it 
met some 50% of New Zealand 1 s consumer energy marke.t. 
From this point on, it started to decline and now provides 
only about 17?~. There were s.everal reasons for this. 
Firstly, in New Zealand coal production has. traditionally 
been labour-intensive so that production costs have risen 
in line with wage rates. In addition coal has suffered 
because of fluctuati!lg levels of reliability of supply. 
In the past the coal mine workers wer~ much more militant 
than today, and until 19.51 the United Mine Workers of New 
· Zealand was one of the. country's most power.ful unions. 
The militancy of the coal miners' unions was curbed to a 
la!'ge degree following the 1951 watersiders 1 strike, which 
many of the mine workers supported. As a result the 
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number of working days lost declined sharply but the dam~ge 
to the coal industry had already been done by the history of 
unreliable supplies. Secondly, transpurtation cost& have 
also risen_ greatly in the last twenty years and coal is a 
bulky commodity. Thirdly, public attitudes: have cha!lged in 
two ways. The trend in demand has been for cleaner, more 
convenient ene~0gy forms for .the home. In addition, the 
growth in concern for the environment has meant that people 
·are now resisting the use of coal. for industry ur la!'ge 
scale systems in their towns and citie.s. Recently, also 
technological advances appeared to make: coal obsolete as a 
· fuel for some major uses. This was parti~ularly evident 
I 
in the transport sector where coal was the niajor fuel for 
shipping and railways. The loss of thes·e markets has had 
an enormous effect on coal consumption. 2.9. Meanwhile the 
use of oil in New Zealand has increased markedly in recent 
years (see Table 1). Oil and oil products provide by· far 
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the largest share of New Zealand's energy market (see Table 
1J. Petroleum has been re::\ponsible for a large 
proportion of the declining role of coal in the New Zealand 
energy market over the last. fifty years. Over this period 
the coal industry h2.s lost its railway and shippj_ng 
trans.port markets completely to petroleum and natural 
. heati!lg, industria,l and. gas maki~tg load to .petroleum and 
natural_ gas; it has also lost part .of .its heati~g and 
.. cooki!lg load to electricity. Growth in demand. for coal 
has been confined to steel making, el~ctr.icity_ generation 
2..nd the heating .of' public buildi!lgs .. 30. 
Oil has s.ever>al major advant?-ges over. .coal as an 
er!e~gy soux'ce includi!lg those of easier. handling, greater 
convenience, and, more recently, pollution abatemen.t. In 
addition except duri~g, and for a short period after, the 
second World War, the supply of petroleum has been assure.d . 
. Costs have also played a b~g part in the transfer to the use 
.of oi.1 . Even as late as September 1973, the posted price 
.of Arabian l~ght crude had risen by only. 56 percent above 
its January 1955 leve.I. 3.1. .Whe'n one .. considers that the 
. consumer price index in New Zealand rose by .over twice that 
amount {116 percent). 32 ,. during the same period, it is not 
difficult .to appreciate that petroleum had become a . .very 
competitively priced commod::t ty by the early 1970 1.s. 
In any. consideration of New Zealand's position vis-· 
~-vis oil, three additional points must be not~d. These 
are, (a) the dist.!•ibution .of .consmnpt:ton .of petroleum 
products; 
( b )\ 'c i,. ••. e·· 1 1 f' · " · 1 · !. eve s o inc.igE·nous supp J,E:;_S; 
.(C.) the levels and sources of imports. of crude oil 
and .refined petroleum products. 
The distributJon of consumpti 0 n of .pet·roleum products 
; 2 5. 
is an important. factor. These. f~gures are important . .because . 
.they can provide a rough indicator of how 'essential'· the use 
.of oil in a. gi veri country i.s. Much ~f the oil used in 
transportation is. for private. motori!lg, and much .of the 
residential use is. for space heati~g and l~ghti!lg. In a 
.period .of crisis, these are .the ty.pe of uses on which savi!lgs 
could be made, whereas the use ·or oil as an input in the 
productive apparatus, either. for enepgy or as a raw material 
will o~ly be .curtailed as a last resort,. be~ause pf the 
implications for outp:ut and employment. 
The industrial and commercial sec.tor takes about. 40 percent 
pf New Zealand's consumer enepgy requirements, and petroleum 
supplies approximately one third of this. f~gure (See Table 2 ). 
Table 2 
NEW ZEALAND'S. ENERGY REQUIREMENTS 
Industrial· & Commercial 
Transport 
Households 
Ele.ct-
Total of which Petroleum .Coal r.ie.ity . 
. 38% .. .33~% . 28% . 38~% 
',47% almost lOO% nil nil 
15% 9!z% 15% 75!z% 
SOURCE: Based on. f~gures used by H~gg, op.c.it., pp.90-92 • 
. Households consume about 16. percent. .of the. consumer enepgy 
· .req·uirements in New Zealand, hut oil supplies only about 10 
.pe.r:cent of this.· demand. By far the most outstandi!lg use 
of petroleum, however, is in the transport sector~ The 
transport sector. takes nearly half of New Zealand's 
consumer ene:r-gy requiremehts. This market is supplied 
almost wholly by petroleum products with· .slightly over half 
I·-, ' 
bei!lg motor spirits and the remainder splj_t between aviation 
. fuels, bunker. fuels and diesel. This h~gh concentration on 
, c:'.U 
the transport sector is reflected by the £act that New 
Zealand, with one of the h~ghest per capita car ownership 
f~gures, ranks h~ghly in a list .of .motor spirit consumers 
(Table 3). When this high motor spirit us!lge is combined 
~_:_] 
· CONSUMPTION OF MOTOR SPIRIT (including .aviation gasoline) 
COUNTRY 
· United States 
Canada 
Australia 
Puerto Rico 
New Zealand 
Switzerland 
Sweden 
: Venezuela 
West Germany 
Britain 
France 
Norway 
Netherlands 
Italy 
Japan 
South Africa 
' Gallons per head ~ 1911 · 
. 37:3 · • .8 
' 28,9., 4 
18.6.1. 
176. 5 
14;9 .. 1 . 
lll.2 
. lOJ. 6 
. 8.8.2 
. 85 .1 
. 8.0'. 4 
. -7:7. 6 
, , 75~ 4 
; 73 .• 3 
' 53·. 7 
' 46. 6 
: 4:2.:. 4 
SOURCE: Oil and Australia 19.7 3, (Petroleum Information 
Bureau (Australia) 1973), p.40. 
with New Zealand's. lack of oil. fired stations, and 
comparatively 'low industrialization the result is that New 
Zealand has the highest motor spirit requirement as a 
·proportion of its total petroleum usage of any country 
.(Table 4:). 
Although petrolelim provides .such a la~ge .share of 
New Zealand's primary energy, there is. very little 
indigenous oil available at present. Like'. many other 
countries since the second World War, New Zealand has come 
to depend upon imported oil. In 1g7~ ~~w Zealand's 
hydrocarbon production was only .1.1 million barrels of 
condensate and 1.2. 5 thousand million cubic. feet of natural 
27 
gas. 33. This necessitates the arrival of an 80,000 to 
100,000 ton tanker at the Marsden Point refinery every 
four days or so. The Marsden Point refinery produce~ 
Table 4 
. 
MOTOR SPIRIT USAGE AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL 
PETROLEUM USAGE 
New Zealand 
United States 
Venezuela 
Australia 
South Africa 
Canada 
Switzerland 
Puerto Rico 
United Kingdom 
West Germany 
France 
Norway 
Italy 
Sweden 
Netherlands 
Japan 
% 
46 
40 
35 
35 
33 
32 
19 
18 
16 
15 
15 
13 
12 
11 
10-
9 
SOURCE: Energy in New Zealand, p.92. 
about 80 percent of New Zealand's oil needs. About 41 
percent of its annual output is gasoline, 21 percent is 
diesel, 35 percent is light and heavy·fuel oils and 3 
percent is bitumen. The remaining 20 percent of New 
Zealand's refined requirements are imported. 34. 
In a situation where most of New Zealand's oil is 
imported it is necessary to establish the.sources of those 
imports. New Zealand has a very heavy dependence upon 
Table 5 
ORIGIN OF NEW ZEALAND'S OIL IMPORTS 
Crude Petroleum 1972 1973 
% % 
Brunei 6.4 1.3 
Iran 19.2 15.9 
Kuwait 67.2 .~ 82.8 
Saudi Arabia 3,2 --· Nil 
SOURCE: Mr Freer, in The Radiator, 2 April, 1974, 
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Middle Eastern oil (see Table 5). It is very significant 
that over 80 percent of New Zealand's imports of crude oil 
come from Kuwait, one of the more extreme Arab countries. 
To summarize, petroleum supplies about 60 percent 
of New Zealand's primary energy, and of this more than 80 
percent comes from Arab countries. It is in this context 
that one must view the oil crisis and New Zealand's reactions 
to the oil crisis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE OIL CRISIS 
When, on 17 October, 1973, after numerous muffled 
threats,the Arab leaders decided to use their abundant 
supplies of oil as a political weapon in their war against 
Israel, the 'politics of oil' became a reality. Since then 
oil has dominated most discussions of international politics. 
There was nothing new about the Arab declaration - similar 
mutterings had been heard on several occasions previously. 
What was new, however, was the level of solidarity achieved 
by the Arab bloc. The co-operation among the oil exporting 
countries was truly remarkable, particularly in view of the 
deep socio-political divisions among them. 
What has happened to bring about such an immense 
change, seemingly so unexpectedly, and certainly so quickly? 
Behind the morass of recent political and economic 
developments lie several significant facts - the current 
rates of world oil production, the location of proven oil 
reserves, and the relative costs of obtaining those reserves. 
In the industrial world there are two dominant oil-producing 
regions - North America and the Middle East - which, together 
produced approximately 60 percent of the total world oil 
production in 1973 (see Table 6). The location of the 
world's oil reserves is even more concentrated, with nearly 
5~ percent of .reserves in the Middle East (See Table 7). 
The oil reserves of Saudi Arabia alone are enormous in com-
parison with\.those of North America. In addition, while US 
production is still the highest of any single nation in the 
~orld, the actual cost of producing Middi~ Eastern oil is 
only a fraction of the production costs of US oil. Whereas 
Saudi Arabian oil costs 4.6 cents a barrel and Iranian oil 
r.rable 6 
WORLD OIL PRODUCTION 1972 .and 1973 
3".)· . . .) 
AREA 
Million Tons 
1972 . . 1973 
Percentage 1973 
share of total 
North America 
Caribbean· 
South America 
WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
' . 
645. 8 
· lss·. 8 
·: u·i.5· 
·s76.1 . 
646 .·7 . 
. 197. 4 
4:7. 4 
. 89J. 5 
Western Europe 2.2 . .2 22. 6. 
· Middle East · 895. 4 · 1045. 2 · 
Africa 282~.4. · 291.5· 
South East. Asia 65. 7 · · 80 .5 
. USSR . 39.4. 0 . 4~r;o 
Eastern Europe & China · 48. 8 5.T. 2 
Other Eastern Hemisphere 26. 7 2.7 .. 9 
EASTERN HEMISPHERE . 1735. 2 1945. 9 
WORLD (excJ.· USSR, . 
E.EUROPE & CHINA) 
WORLD 
'216.8.5 . 2359.2 
. 26_11.3 2837. 4 
. 22 •. 8 
: 7. 0 
.. 1:. 7 
.·.3.l.5 
· :o:·. 7 · 
. 36. 8 
. 10.. 3 
. ·.2 .9 
1;4·. 8 
. :2. 0 
.· :1 •. 0 
. 6.8. 5 
. BJ.2 
100.·. 0 
SOURCE: BP statistical review of the world oil industry -
1973' p .. r.-
Table. 7 
PROVEN RESERVES OF OIL - in billions of barrels 
Saudi Arabia 
Russia 
Kuwait 
Iran 
: USA 
Libya 
Iraq 
Abu Dhabi 
China 
N~geria 
: .450 
; 75 
; 73 -
. 65 
. 37 
. 30 
. 29 -
: .21 ·. 
. 20 
.· 15. 
SOURCE: T.he Economist,: _2 March,_ 19.7 4 
.. costs 12. cents a barrel, _it costs. 75 cents. a barrel. to 
produce American oi:l ... 1.. North American oil has only cont-... -
inued to be produced because of. government. concern over 
secure supplies and the resulti!1g protection of the domestic 
industry. For many years oil was a .cheap. fuel everywhere 
and duri!J.g the 'fifties and 'sixties o'il>consumption moved 
up rapidly, .both in terms of absolute. volume and as a 
proportion .of total energy consume.d .. 2. However, .the oil-
exporting nations, despite continuing efforts to develop a 
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collective policy throygh the Organization of Petroleun1 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), 3, .had little ability. to control 
international oil prices to their advantage even as late as 
the. 3rd Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967; s.ufficient maFginal 
productive capacity was still available in the·~ United States 
to. offset any threat of supply curtailment by. the oil-
exporti~g nation.s. 
Throyghout the post-war years, however, a cha~ge was 
.steadily taking place. Even· with protection· of the· US 
price, proven reserves of US oi1 did not keep pace with that 
country's. growth in oil consumption. Bi 1970, inde~d, US 
oil output had reached a peak and. from theri on, increases in 
demand had to be met. entirely by imports, includi~g the first 
significant inflow from the Middle Eas.t .. By 1970, the Middle 
East had the only surplus supply of oil available and .even 
the relatively small curtailment of exports from Libya in 
.. that .year had sufficient impact to start the upward move in 
world oil prices. Indee·d, .on·e Middle East nation, namely 
Saudi Arabia, was theri supplying enough of world exports to 
be the. effective determiner of both prices. and supply. 
Events. leadi~g to the .changed oil situation were_ gradual. 
· But when the watershed year,· 1970, was reached, a new era 
had been entere.d. 
In· 1970, .the states: belo~ging to. OPEC .fulfilled an 
ambition as old as the OFganization· its.eTf: for the. first 
time,_ they .forced the fore~·gn oil companies. operati~g on 
their .soil .to concede increases in the tax reference (cir 
posted) prices for oil .. 4. The.re were signs that, .far 
from this bei~g the end of a proce~s, it. could be only a 
. . ...__ _ 
b~ginning. The advant~ge in bargaining on the oil trade 
vital .to Europe and Japan seemed to shift sharply to the 
producing countries and away from the buyers, .thus endi~g 
tl1e period of falling prices which had lasted since the 
first closure of the Suez Canal in 1956. In 1971, the 
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Teheran and Tripoli agreements provided for steadily rising 
returns to the Middle Eastern oil-producing countries up to 
1975, In January 1972,0PEC,having asserted that the effective 
devaluation of the dollar had reduced the real value of those 
benefits, succeeded in extracting a compensatory 8.49% increase 
in the dollar 'posted p~ice'. One tendency which became apparent 
during 1972 was for producing countries and, to a growing 
extent, consuming countries as well, to enter into government-
to-government agreements, directly or through national oil 
companies. Another tendency was for the largest producing 
countries to work slowly but steadily towards greater involve-
ment in the downstream sectors of the oil industry. 
The industrial world's first real taste of an effect-
ive Arab oil squeeze came in 1973. The first serious 
initiative for the employment of oil as an instrument of 
political pressure came from Saudi Arabia. As early as 
April 1973, King Faisal sent his oil Minister, Sheikh Yamani 
to Washington with the message that unless the United States 
changed its pro-Israeli stance then Saudi Arabia would not 
significantly expand its current oil production. King 
Faisal reiterated this message on several occasions. 5. 
Even so, there was no clear indication as to when Saudi 
Arabia would actively begin carrying out its threat. The 
first sign of Arab action, rather than threats, came from 
Libya in early September, 1973. It was then that Libya's 
Colonel Gaddaffi suddenly ~ationalized all foreign oil 
companies operating in his parched North African country 
- thereby threatening to set off an oil war between the 
petroleum-rich Arab world and the thirsty industrialized 
West. Gaddaffi's action assumes greater significance if 
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one takes into consideration the close. familial relation·~ 
ship that exists between the Arab bloc. The example of a 
successful manoeuvre ~gainst the West by Gadd~ffi would be 
a source of considerable encouragement for. the .other 1 brother' 
Arab oj_l-producers, who were more directly in conflict with 
Israel, to introduce oil ~nto their bargaining strategy. 
It should be hated at this point that by mid-1g73 
most, if not all, of the Arab oil exporti~g countries had 
reached a position pf economic strength where they could, 
.if necessary, use their oil as a poli t'ical lever without 
unduly damaging their economies. This was due to. the 
recent shift in bargaining power fro~ the buyers to the 
sellers of oil, itself .the outcome of a tighteni~g supply 
situation in the. face of continually risi~g demand for 
crude oil. 
When the war broke .out, Kuwait took the initiative 
of calli~g for a conference ·or Arab oil producing countries 
to determine how Arab oil could best be employed in the 
service of the Arab caus.e. After a one~day meeti~g of the 
oil ministers of the member states· of the Organization of 
A1 ab Petroleum Exporting .Countries (OAPEC.),. .7, a resolution 
was taken to use oil as a direct weapon in the war against 
Israel. The OAPEC countries (with the excep.tion of Iraq )J 
· 8, decided 11 that each Arab oil-exporting country immediately 
.cut its oil production by a recurrent monthly rate of no 
less than 5 per.cent to be initially counted on the. virtual 
pro.duction of September and thenceforth ·on the. last 
production figure until such a time as the international 
community compels Israel to relinquish our occupied 
territories or until the production of every individual 
country reaches the point where its economy does not permit 
of any further reduction without detriment to its national 
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and Arab obligations11 •. 9. It was decided that .countries 
which supported the Arabs actively and effectively, or that 
took significant measures ?lgainst Israel to compel it to 
withdraw from occupied territories, would be. exempted from 
the Duts and would continue to receive their full share of 
Arab oil supplies at the rate pr·evaili~g before the cuts 
wepe introduced. Provision was also made. for extra 
reductions in supplies. to unfriendly countries in proportion 
to their support of and co'-operation with IsraeJ. The 17 
October, 1973, resolution recommended 11 that the. United 
States be subjected to the most severe cut proportionately 
with the quantities of ·crude oil, oil derivatives, and 
hydrocarbons that it imports from every exporti~g country 
(and) that this progressive reduction leads to the halt of 
oil supplies to. the United States from every individual 
country party to the resolution-".· 10.. A total embargo on 
oil supplies to the US was not enforced until· 20 October, 
follow:i.!1g President Nixon's request to Congress for US$2. 2 
billion for military assistance to Israel. Within a few 
days all the s~gnatory countries had cut back production 
by between 5 and io percent, as well as imposing a total 
emba~go on oil shipments. to. the. US and Holland. In the 
·case of the Dutch, the decision was ostensibly taken 
because of Holland's pro-Israeli attitude during the war, 
~ncludi~g its·allowing NATO bases within its territory to 
be used. for the airlift .of US military supplies ·to Israel. 
A second meeti~g of Arab oil ministers was held in 
Kuwait on 4-5 November at which it was decided to boost 
the reduction in Arab oil production tc;i an immediate 25 
percent below the September leve.l. Again Iraq dissociated 
itself from these measures. It was also decided at this 
meeting that a further reduction, amounting to 5 pel;'cent of 
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the November output, would. follow in December provided 
that such a reduction should not affect the share that any 
friendly state was importing from any Arab exporting 
country during the. first nine months of 197.3. 
T_he Arab oil weapon was used selectively and 
countries were classified into three categories: (1) 
hostile, which were subjected to the embaf'.'go; .(2) friendly, 
. ' 
which involved exemption or most....:favoured status; and .(:3) 
neutral, which involved non-exemption but non-emba!·goed 
.status. Output was, first reduced by the across-the-board 
: .cut and then by the amounts allocated to. the most. favoured 
countries. What was left was then divided amo~g the 
neutral countries. Conditions. for a country to_ get on 
the most favoured list involved fulfilli~g some, .or all of 
the. followiJ;1g: 
1) breaking off diplomatic .relations with Israel; 
· 2) applying economic sanctions ~gainst Israel; 
3) affordiJ;1g military assistance to. the Arab 
states. 11 .. 
Several minor concessions were made to some countries 
who made the effort to comply with some of these ~emands 
.during November and Decemqer. A meeting of Arab oil 
ministers held in Kuwait on 24 and 25 December decided to 
raise the level of Arab oil productiori by lQ percent with 
~ffect from 1 January, 1974, thereby reduciJ;1g .the overall 
cutback in Arab oil exports from its December rate of 25 
percent to 15 percent, calculated on the basis of September 
1973 production. The embargo on exports to the US and 
Holland was maintained. 
A stunmi t rneetiJ;1g at Algiers, from 13 to 14. February 
showed the. first major signs of a rift amo!lg the Arab oil 
producers. J\t the summit, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were in 
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favour of lifting the US oil embargo while Algeria and 
Syr1a wanted to retain it as a lever on the. US .for a settle-
ment on the Syrian-Israeli front. Then, on 18 March,. 1974, 
Sheikh. Yamani announced. from Vienna that a meeting of the 
Arab oil Ministers had decided to end the oil supply embargo 
on the US, apparently in recognition of a cha0ge in 
Washi0gton's Middle East policy. Syria and Libya 
dissociated th,emse1ves. from .this move and ?-gain Iraq took no 
part in the meeting. Holland, however, rerriained emba:r-goe.d. 
It was not until 10. July, 1974, that this situation changed. 
On that date a meeti0g of Arab oil Ministers. decided to lift 
the ·emba:r-go on oil shipments to Holland which was the only 
country still under a. full embargo. 
In addition to. this manipu~ation of supplies the OPEC 
members were also manipulati0g the price of oil supplied by 
them (~e~ Table 6). As has been noted, the oil producers 
Table 8. 
OIL PRICE INCREASES - 1973-US$/barrel 
1973 1973 1973 197g. 
Arabian L~ght 1 ·.Jan 15. Oct 16 Oct 1 Jan 
Host Government Take 1.50 . 1. 76 . . .3. 03 .. 7. 00 
Posted Price 2.59 . J. 00 5.11 ·. 11.65 
·-
SOURCE: Chandler, The New Energy Prospect, ~P. 9. 
had been successful in. gradually increasing the price of 
oil since the 1971 ~eheran and Tripoli ?-greement~ .. Even 
as late as 1 January, 1973, the posted price of Arabian 
L~ght crude oil, which is r~garded as the marker price for 
Middle East ·crude, was only US$2.59 a barrel. This figure 
had risen to US$3.oo .a barrel by early October, 1973. 
· Until 16 October, 1973, some restraint on pI'ice rises, even 
.if rapidly eroding because of the producer-countries' 
bargaining power in a situation of narrowing supply/demand 
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balance, had been imposed by industry bargaining, as had 
consistency in the price relationship of different crud~s. 
12. However, on 16. October, 1973, ·the OPEC. countries 
bro:ught to an end price negotiations with the oil companies 
by the unilateral declaration .of a 70 perc$nt increase in 
posted price. Thi~ raised the posted price td USt5.11 a 
barrel. Then, at the end of December, 1973; a further 130 
percent incr~ase in posted price and host. gove;rnment .'take' 
was announced, to take effect from 1 January, 1974 .. This 
raised the posted pri9e td US$11.65 a barrel. 
After the rapid increases in the posted price in the 
last quarter of 1973; the OPEC oil Ministers froze the. 1974 
price despite recornmendations for a price increase by the 
OPEC Economic Commission, which bases its proposals solely 
on economic considerations, whereas· the ~inisters are also 
swayed by political factors .. i3. Then, at a meeti~g in 
Vienna on 15 December, 197 4 ,. the OPEC countries fixed the 
price of crude oil. for the first nine months of 1975. 14 . 
. The new, uniform price structure ·is based on a price of 
: US$10.46 a barrel. for Saudi Arabian l~ght crude, as from 1 
January, 1975. The OPEC. oil Ministers have agreed that 
the new uniform price will not be increased to offset 
ipflation duri~g the. first nine months o{ 1975. 
1}. These costs. are quoted by C.Rand in his ·article 
.''rhe. Arabian Fantasy', .. in Harper's Magazine, January, 1974, 
pp .. 42-54. 
2). See BP Statistical review of the world oil industry 
- 1973, pp.8-9 . 
. 3) OPEC. consists of Abu Dhabi, Iran, 'Iraq, Kuwait, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Venezuela, 
and Indonesia. Their exports accounted for more than 85 
percent of the world oil trade in 1973· 
.<.t 
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4) See Z. Mikdashi, 'Co-operation among oil exporting 
countries with special-reference to Arab countries: a 
political economy analysis', in International Organization, 
vol.28, no.l, Winter,1974, pp.1-30. 
5) Especially in an interview which appeared in the 10 
September,1973, issue of Newsweek. 
6) See P.Vatikiotis, Conflict in the Middle East, 
(London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1971), pp.8-9 and 
p.20 for an explanation of the development of the Arab 
familial relationship. 
7) OAPEC members are Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Bahrein, Egypt, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Oman 
and Tunisia have applied for membership. 
8) Iraq publicly dissociated itself from the decision 
and criticized the Arab oil embargo and cutback measures 
as counter-productive in that they tended to penalize 
friend and foe alike, and proposed that the Arab oil states 
concerned should follow its example of nationalizing the oil 
assets of US and Dutch companies. See F.Itayim, 'Arab oil-
the political dimension', in the Journal of Palestine Studies 
no.11, 1974, p.90. 
9) Quoted from the Arab communiquG, printed in Survival, 
January/February, 1974, pp.38-39. 
10) Loe.cit. 
11),· Itayim, op.cit.,pp.84-97. 
12) See G.Chandler, President, Institute of Petroleum 
U.K., The New Energy Prospect, (Shell Oil Co.Publication, 
1974)9p.2. 
13) The Press (Christchurch), 2 September, 1974. 
14) The Press (Christchurch), 16 December, 1974. 
15) Loe.cit. 
CHAPTER 3 
NEW ZE1-l.LAND 1 S REACTIONS TO THE OIL CRISIS 
To talk of a New Zealand foreign policy, as if there 
was a single policy which could be easily defined or 
described} is rather unrealisti.c. Instead, there are many 
complicating factor>s which influence the formulation of a 
foreign policy decisio.n. While it is t.rue that most 
countries can define the general nature of their fore~gn 
policy, it is harder to be more specific. .It is, however, 
ea;sier and more realistic to talk of foreign policy object-
i ves. New Zealand, like many other countries, has many 
fore~gn policy objectives, but they' can be. classified under 
three headi!1gs - security and defen_ce objectives; prosperity 
and economic welfare obj.ectives·; and idealistic and identity 
objectives . .1; These objectives· can, arid often do, overlap; 
a.government hopes that policies des~gned to further one set 
of .objectives will promote others als.o. 
I - SECURITY AND DEFENCE OBJECTIVES 
Altho).lgh by no means watert~ght distinctions, it is 
possible to classify security threats into three. cat~gories: 
(1). a direct threat; 
(2.) a threat to one's. regional security; and 
{3) an indirect threat 
There has certainly been no direct threat to New 
Zealand's. security as a r~sult of the 4th Arab-Isr~eli 
conflict or the ensuing oil cri~is. 
The highly unusual circumstances of New Zealand's 
Political, economic and. ge~graphic environment have hindered 
the development of r~gional identity in the sense defined by 
theorists elsewhere. 2. However, whether one considers 
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New Zealand's. region (if, indeed, it belo~gs to one) as bei~g 
either Asia or the Pacific, there has been no real threat to 
r~gional security. as a result of th~ .4th Arab-Israeli 
conflict or the oil crisis. 
It is only in the third category, that of the 
indirect threat, that New Zealand's. security. could possibly 
be thought of as having been threatene.d. An indirect 
threat occurs when there is a conflict which threatens the 
international environment, and which ther~fore may involve 
an otherwise non-invo.lved nation·. Oil was a weapon employed 
by the. Arab nations in an attempt to secure a political 
settlement to the Middle East conflict. The use of oil as 
a weapon has not, as yet,: solved th~ Middle East conflict. 
The conflict remains as. volatile as ever and, if it erupted 
~·gain, could very easily threaten the international, rather 
than just the Middle Eastern environment. A renewed out-
break may involve the superpowers, could possibly involve 
the ·use of nuclear weapons, and could conceivably spark off 
a third World War. However, these are very_ generalized 
threats, are not perceived as being very imminent,. and 
therefore have not been very influential upon New Zealand's. 
J 
· fore~gn policy makers. 
II - ECONOMIC WELFARE AND PROSPERITY OBJECTIVES 
Most_ governments are usually. concerned to ensure the 
economic welfare and prosperity. of their communities. New 
: Zealand is no exception, and concern with the level of 
prosperity has played an important part in determini~g New 
Zealand's reactions to. the oil crisis. The threats to the 
pursuit of economic welfare and prosper~ty .. objectives can be 
divided into (a) direct and 
(b) indirect threats. 
The oil crisis certainly posed some considerable 
threats to New Zealand's prosperity and economic welfare. 
Two main direct threats can be distinguished. The. first 
was the threat to New Zealand's supplies of Middle Eastern 
oil and the associated price increase.s. The second direct 
threat relates to the effects th~ oil crisis had on New 
Zealand's economy. 
The Arab oil producers decided to use oil as a weapon 
on 17. October, 197.3. For New Zealand, which is more than 
· 80 percerit dependent upon Arab oil, such a decision was ,of 
considerable importance. Naturally erio!J.gh, then, the 
'-l'-1 
events in the Middle East were. followed with interest by New 
Zealand's decision-makers. On 15 October, 1973, New Zealand 
oil industry spokesmen were warning the New Zealand public 
~gainst panicking .over a possible oil short~ge. At this 
time, the Marsden Poiht oil refinery was prepari~g for its 
biennial, three-week maintenance shutdown from 26. October to 
16. Novembe.r. While it is true that especially h~gh supplies 
.of refined petroleum products were imported in the last 
quarter ,of 19.73, these were mainly to cover the 200,000 tons 
pf output which were to be lost as a result ,of the Marsden 
Point shutdown, a.nd not to build up reserves. National oil 
stocks at .this st?-ge were said to represerit about six weeks 
supply. The price of premium_ grade petrol in New Zealand 
was 48 cents per gallon when the oil crisis broke. 
On 18. October, New Zealand's Prime Minister, Mr. Kirk, 
thO!J.ght that New Zealand m~ght not be affected by the Arab 
decision to cut oil production, because New Zealand had not 
11 taken sides (in the war) nor are we lik.ely to". 3. The 
oil industry was not so sure, how.ever, and was concerned 
about the confused Middle East situation and felt unable to 
make a clear assessment of its effects on New Zealand~ oil 
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marke.t. 
On 13 November, New Zealand's Deputy Prime Minister, 
Mr Watt, .disclosed that the Cabinet Economic Committee was 
watching. the oil situation daily. The oil ·crisis had not 
yet h~d much im_pact and Mr Watt was t:Jtill hopeful that New 
Zealand would not be adver.sery affected ·by. the situation 
.overseas. However, just two ··days later, .the New Zealand 
Government was b~ginning to· show mor.e concern.· on· 15. 
November, Prime Minister Kirk announced that the. Australian 
Government had ?-gre·ed; to the importation into New Zealand of 
supplies of crude oi.l. Then, ori 16 N.o.vember, the G.overn-
ment warned New Zealanders to look more closely at the use 
they· made of oil products, and at hOw they. could avoid 
wasteful practices. Altho!-..lgh at this stage the Government 
was reviewi!lg contingency plans in case o·f possible 
shurt?-ges, Ene~gy Resources Minister Freer said that New 
: Zealand had not yet. been affected by. cuts in supplies from 
. the Arab states. Further indications of G.overnmental 
concern came later in November when Prime Minister Kirk 
announced that his Government was pressi!lg the oil companies 
to. ensure that New Zealand continued to. get .its nor.n:al 
supplies of petrol. Mr Kirk maintained that he had had no 
indication that. the producing countries had si!lgled out New 
Zealand for cuts in supplies. He also stated that New 
Zealand's first priority was to get supplies, and then to 
worry about the price. 
At his press conference on 27 November, Prime Minister 
Kirk repeated that the supply situation was normal and that 
New Zealand would continue to. get shipments after those 
already en rout.e. However, he added that the .supplies 
might not be the full quantities and appealed for a voluntary 
savi0g of 5 percent in oil use. At his press conference on 
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3 December, Mr Kirk again appealed to people to save all the 
petrol and oil they. could. Mr Kirk then outlined the. first 
steps taken to impose oil curb.s. The measures announced 
were the imposition of an immediate 50 m.p.h. speed limit on 
all roads, includi~g motorways; the immediate cessation of 
all oil company promotional advertising; limiti~g ships' 
bunkering to 1973 levels; the immediate cessation .of all oil-
generated electricity. supply except_ for testing purposes; 
changes in the public passe~ger services r~gulations to 
allow for 'pooling';. the power .for service stations to 
refuse sales to anyone .suspected of hoarding, and the 
introduction of 'glide time' (st!=tggered worki~g hours) in 
the public servic.e. 
It seems that by this .stage New Zealand was b~ginni~g 
to Seel the effects of the oil cri~is. Conservation of 
supplies had become. vital, and spec·ulation was rife as to 
how such conservation would be. enforced. The most obvious 
measures were either by a substantial price rise or by 
rationing •. Rationi~g had been de~lared.by Mr Kirk as a 
last measure only, .and it soon became clear that the price 
of petroleum products would rise,. both to compensate the oil 
companies for the increased prices of the oil they were now 
payi~g, and to attempt. to. cut domestic consumptio.n. 
Then, on 17 December, after the last Cabinet meeti~g 
.of the year, a note of optimism was sounded when the Acting 
Prime Minister, Mr Watt, .said that no furth~r measures to 
· restrict petrol use were likely_ for. five week.s. He. did, 
however, emphasize that people still had to keep. trying to 
save petrol, and noted that one or two measures may still 
need to be taken but not immediately. The Government, it 
seems, was wooing the public, obviously believi~g that -
under true Labour philosophy - everyone should have a Summer 
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holiday before facing the realities of an international 
crisis. When, on 24 December, the Arab oil producers 
announced a 10 percent production increase, .it appeared 
that the Government's policy not to rush into emepgency 
measures might have been vindicate.d. 
How.ever, the voluntary savings were inadequate and 
by early January, 1974, .it was apparent .that the situation 
required a strong l~gislative approach rather than appeals 
to the pub lie' s better natur.e. The. growing concern of the 
G.o.vernment became clearer when, on· 8 January, Mr Freer 
refused to. give any indication of stocks or petrol 
consumption f~gure.s. · The oil supply situation had become 
one .of rriajor concern. for the Governmen.t. 
Given the Government'' s assurances that rationi~g of 
petrol would only be. us.ed as a last resort, it was not 
.surprising that, at midnight on 24. January, .the price. of 
pet.rol rose 11 .cents a. gallon, maki~g premium. grade petrol 
59 cents a. gallon. This incr~ase ~as a direct result of 
the greatly increased costs incurred by the oil compani~s. 
The increase did not take into account the increased 
chapges for oil which OPEC imposed from 1 January, 1974. 
The petrol price increase was also intended to reduce the 
demand for petrol, and thereby help to. conserve .supplies. 
The Government realized, however, that .ever further 
measures would be needed if sufficient. conservation was to 
··occur. As ·a result, Mr Kirk announced, on 22 January, 
that the sale of petrol between midday on Saturdays and. 7am 
on Mondays was to be banned. from 9 February. 
When these regulations were approved at the 5 Feb-
ruary Cabinet meeti~g, Mr Freer said that. further Cabinet 
decisions would be made if the supply situation did not 
improve. Mr Freer said that the most likely move would 
, 4 8 
be the banning of all pr.ivate motori!lg from noon on Sundays 
every second Sunday. Mr Freer stated that New Zealand was 
now being affected by the reduced oil production, and was 
bei~g stibjected to a cut nf 15 to ~o percent. This short-
fall was being exacerbated by the increasing consumption 
levels. 
.. 
Figur~s supplied by the National Road~ Board 
indicated that .. consumpti.on of petrol had risen 12. percent in 
the. four months immediate.ly .after the oil short?-ge began. 4. · 
However, the Government's oil savi~g measures started 
to: have their desir~d ~ffect, and by .the end ·or February the 
supply crisis appeared to be easi!lg·r For example, petrol 
consumption had dropped considerably and by. the end of 
February, 1974, petrol consumption was, according to Mr Watt 
only up. 7. 4 3 percent on the same period a year earlier. 5. 
. . 
By the end of February the mood in most official statements 
had alt.ered slightly. The ·commissioner of Energy Resources 
Mr R.J~ H?gg, told a conference held in Nelson that the oil 
crisis was not· .over, bU:t the rest of his comments dealt with 
New Zealand's. concern to get a fair share of petroleum 
rather than running oU:t or· supplies. 6. 
Then on 28. February, Mr Freer returned from Australia 
wi.th ·assurances of additional dies.el supplies ·from Australia • 
. This came hard on the heels of the ·revelation that diesel oil 
.stocks held at New Zealand's. main ports were only. 7 million 
gallons on 1 December, 1973, compared with. 16 ,·617, 000 
gallons on 1 ·De cemher, 1972 •. 
The overall supply s.ituation appeared to improve 
further after the return of the diplomatic mission which New 
Zealand sent around the Middle Eastern oil ·produci!lg states. 
At a news conference, Mr Kirk said that the mission, led by 
Mr J.Y. Scott, had discovered sources of oil and refined 
products that could be available to New Zealan.d. Thei:i, on 
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6 warch, Mr Freer told Parliament that the oil companies had 
Jnformed him that their supply position was improving. On 
32 March, Mr Kirk acknowledged that :the price of oil was a 
bif~ger problem than the supply problem. Two days later, 
the Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, .Mr J .Y. Scott, who 
had recently returned. from the Middle East, said that the 
world oil supply crisis had eased considerably. However, 
as New Zeal.and was at the end of the line it would take a 
little longer for the improvement to be noticed, )J.e adde.d. 
on 21 March, Mr Freer confirmed that tl_le .supply position 
was easing, but added that. the price question remained. 
The price rise was delayed until after the Easter 
Holidays. Mr Fre~r also tempor~rily lifted the week-end 
ban on sales of motor spirits for th~ Easter week-end. He 
denied that this mov·e was a reflection of any s~gnificant 
improvement in the supply situation, but .obviously felt 
stocks were in no danger of bei!lg exhausted. The price of 
petrol went up 9 cents a. gallon at midnight on 18. April, 
thus making the new price of premium. grade petrol 68 cents 
The price of diesel rose by 1.2.J cents a gallon 
to .43 cents., and fuel: oil by. 7.12 cents to 26. cents a 
gallon. The increases were to cover the addition~l prices 
since 1 January, 1974. Mr Freer acknowledged .. ·at this 
stage that there had been an improvement in the supply 
position of oil products. However, .the restrictions 
applying to the use ~f motor spirits. - the 50 m.p.h. speed 
limit and restricted week-end sales -' remained in. force. 
'l1his was, presumably, to cover the possibility of any 
lmcertainties of future ·supplie~. 
Retail petrol prices went up ?-gain by 1 .cent a 
Gallon at midnight on 1 May, maki!lg premium. grade 69 cents 
a gallon. Thus, as a restilt of the rising price of oil 
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charged by the OPEG countr~es since the 4th Arab-Israeli 
conflict, the price of premium grade petrol .rose .21 .cents a 
gallon, or about 43 percent. This substantial increase in 
price certainly made the consumer more conscious of the need 
to use. fuel efficiently. Accordi~g to figures released by 
the National .Roads Board, total petrol consumption for the 
first six months of 1974 was down compared with the same 
period in 1973. Whereas 241·;071, 702 gallons were consumed 
in the first six months of 1973, only 240 ,.810 ,573. gallons 
were consumed in the corresponding period in 197:4 .. 7. 
According to Ene!gy Resource& Minister Freer, the final 
f~gures for 1974 showed a ma!ginal reduction in petrol 
consumption - half of one percent - for the year. This 
· represented a much ·greater saving in real terms. Predict-
.ions based on us~ge patterns over previous years had 
estimated a rise of about ll ·percent in motor spirits 
. consul!lption during 1974. · 8. Mr Freer. felt that the 
· reduction in us~ge seerried to have been caused mainly by the 
introduction of the 50 ;n.p .h. maximum speed limit,. the 
.. compulsory closi~g early in the year of petrol stations at 
weekends, and a. general awarenes·s by the .public and the 
: commercial sector of the need to ·save :fuel'. 
At the same time ·as he announced the. 1 .cent increase 
in petrol prices, Mr Freer said that there was still a need 
to. conserve fue:l. Howe.ver, .because of a ttsl~ght improve-
nient in supplies",9, Mr Freer also announced the restoration 
of normal week-end supplies·. After the decision to restore 
the week-end sales of motC>r spirits the oil problem be'dame 
one of price rather than supply. 
On 15 October, the price paid by New Zealand for 
crude oil ~gain increased . This, allied with the effects 
. of a 9 percent dev2.luation of the New Zealand dollar in 
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September., will undoubtedly lead to further increase in 
the :price of motor spirits in New Zealand early in · 197.5. 
During the oil crisis there was a plethora of 
statements, estimates, and guesses at·just how severely 
New Zealand was being affected by the oil supply crisi.s. 
Some idea of New Zealand's position· .can. be: ·gained from an 
examination of the figures of imports of crude petroleum 
Table 9 
QUAHTERLY IMPORTS OF CRUDE PETROLEUM (Tons) 
19.T1...:2 . 1972...:3 ' 1973-4 
July-Sept . 52r,728 ·546,269 . 679 ,290 
Oct-Dec . 314 ,9.21 ·. . 674,644 '612·, 8_09 
Jan-March 523,050 583,932. 437,140 
Apr-June 555,155 . 419" 851 ·704,457 
SOURCE: New Zealand Monthly Abstract of· Statistics, 
November, 1974, p.38. 
(see. Table 9). Fro~ these. f~gures it ~s cle~r that New 
Zealand suffered a shortfall of supply in the last quarter 
of 1973 of about 62,835 tons compared with the last 
quarter of 197.2. The short fall was even. greater for the 
first quarter of 1974 compared with supplies duri~g the 
first quarter of 1973: It appears th~t the first quarter 
or' 1974 was the most crucial period for New Zealand's oil 
supplies. · Duri~g the six month period from October,, 1973, 
.to March,' 1974, imports of crude oil were about 209 ,627. tons 
less than the corresponding period a year earlier. The 
' . 
improved supply situation after the. first quarter of 197 4 
can be. ga~ged from the increase of 284,606 tons in the 
. ,·' 
second quarter of 1974 compared with the second quarter of 
197.3. 
The .overall situation from these figures (the latest 
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available at time of writing) shows an increase of crude 
petrolewn imports for the nine months from October, 1973, to 
June, 19.74, of 75,979 tons compared with the same ~eriod a 
year earlier. This does not mean, however, .that New Zealand's 
oil supply situation has returned to .its pre-oil crisis 
condition. The .overall increase of crude petroleum imports 
from 1971...:2 to 1972"-'.3 was 309, 842. tons. The correspondi~g 
figure from 1972-3 to 1973...:4 was only 209., 000 .tons, a 
decrease of 10.0 ,000 .tons. This. f~gure is for the total 
crude petrolelim imports only and the. gap between supply and 
demand is considerably. greater if one makes allowance for 
any expected increased .consumption level. It ia clear, then, 
that, in these terms, New Zealand did suffer from an oil 
supply crisis. It seems to ine th~t, with an estimated 
expected increased conswnption rate of, say,· 100,000 tons, 
plus the direct decrease of about lCJ0.,.000 tons, then New 
Zealand appears to have ·s:uffered an overall shortfall of 
about 200.,000 tons, which translates to about. 10 percent of 
New Zealand's annual consumption. 
The oil price crisis, .while not as ·immediately 
speritacular as the supply crisis, also ~ffected, and will 
continue to affect New Zealan.d. According to the latest 
figures, the value of New Zealand's imports. of Mineral Fuels, 
Lubricants, and Related Materials, .increased by abOut 
$93, 000, 000 in 197 4 (s.ee Table. lOJ. It appears that .the 
full effects of the oil price rises will amount to about 
$200, 000, 000 for the yea·r 197 4-75. An increased oil bill of 
this size must rate as a very serious threat. to New Zealand's 
economic welfare. 
Quite ·clearly the oil ·crisis also posed a direct 
threat to New Zealand's. economy. · The effects have been seen 
j_n two main areas - inflation, and the balance of payments 
Table 10 
VALUE OF IMPOR1rs - MINERAL FUELS' LUBRICANTS' AND RELATED 
MATERIALS 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971' 
1972 
197 3 (prov. ) 
1974(p.rov.) 
$47,819 '000 
' $51,691,:000 
' $ 3 9 ,. 9 4 5 ' 0 0 0 
$ 4 4 ·, 8 6 3 ' 0 0 0 
$48,.042,000 
. $56,248,000 
$59,094,000 
$ 6 0 ,. 6 2 5 ,. 0 0 0 
$6 6 ,.59 3' 0.00 
$76,666,000 
. $16.9 ,997,00.0 
MONTHLY .<:Provisional) 
'1973 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
1974 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
SOURCE: 
' $ 8 ' 45 5 ' 0 0 0 
$10,205,000 
. $9 ,-94 3',000. 
'$5,-239,000 
.'$10 '89 7 '000 
$4,952,000 
.. $10·,032 ,ooo 
· .$13.,844',.ooo. 
' $13,604 ,.ooo 
.·$11;404 ,ooo 
$30,892,000 
$22 ,.014 '000 
. $26,971,.00.0. 
New Zealand Monthly Abstract of .Statistics, 
· November, 1974, _p. 32 · 
situation. A slow-down in economic growth, continui~g 
inflation, and a significant balance· of payments deficit 
were e~pected. in· 1974 even before th~ oil crisis. The· 
oil ·crisis has certainly accentuated these expe~tations. 
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In common with ·most othe·r dev'el'op'ed nations, New 
Zealand experienced h~gh rates of domestic inflation in the 
1970' $.. During the 1960 1 s prices ros~ by an aver?-ge 3. 8 
percent per annum, but by· 8,5·percent per annum during 
1970.:..73. 1.0. A considerable portiori of New Zealand's 
inflation originates internally. Short?-ges of labour and 
54 
h~gh w~ge settlements have pushed up wage payments much 
faster than increases in the productive capacity of the 
economy . However, as is often characteristic of small 
. states, .New Zealand has a ve~y h~gh dependence upon fore~gn 
trad.e. As a result of the_ h~~h import content in New 
. . 
.Zealand domestic spending, a 10 percent increase in the .. cost 
of· imported_ goods can add 2 percent directly to domestic 
prices. The· cost .of getting goods to New .Zealand also adds. 
. . . . . 
.. to-. domesti.c prices.: }I; As has already .been outlined, the 
h~gher prices for _imported oil resulted in increases in 
domestic prices for petrol, diesel, and other fuels. There 
is no doubt that these increased fuel prices have added to 
the rate of inflation in New Ze~land. It is not true, 
hOwever, that the risi~g price of oil is totally responsible 
for the increased rate of inflation. New Zealand's 
inflation rate was 11.5 percent during 197 4, but .only a 
small part of this was attributable to oil. Most 
estimates put oil's share of the increased cost of living at 
only about 2 or 3 percen.t .. · 1.2. 
While the increased costs of oil and oil products 
added about 2 to 3 percent to New Zealand's. inflation rate 
in 1974, they also had a significant impact of New Zealand's 
balance of payments. position. New Zealand, like many other 
primary producers, had done well out of the world boom of 
1972 and 197.3. In the year ended 30 June,'. .1973, New 
· Zealand enjoyed a trade surplus on current account of $325 
millio.n. In spite of a small reduction in the return from 
dairy products the country's fore~gn exchange reserves 
reached a record level of more than $l, o,oo million. 
However, in the six months.between June and December, 1973, 
.reserves fell to $825 million, and th~ surplus on current 
account had become a deficit of $111 million. 1J.1he New 
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Zealand current account showed a deficit of $718.9 million 
for the year to November, 1974, compared with a surplus of 
$184.6 million in the year to November, 1973, At the end 
of November, 1974, official overseas reserves totalled 
$590.0 million, compared with $892.8 million a year earlier. 
It has been estimated that the balance of payments deficit 
will increase to $890 million for the year ended March 1975, 
an amount equal to more than half of the value of exports 
forecast for that period. 13. 
Obviously, a deterioration of this magnitude in New 
Zealand's balance of payments position is not attributable 
solely to the increased costs of New Zealand's oil imports. 
Other factors which contributed to New Zealand's current 
account deficit included a fall in export prices, a higher 
import volume, and a significant increase in prices paid 
for those imports (see Table 11). On 18 March, 1974, Mr 
Rowling, then Minister of Finance, estimated that the oil 
exporters were likely to take an extra $150 to $170 million 
from New Zealand in 1974. From most estimates, it appears 
that the full effects of the oil price rises are likely to 
in~rease New Zealand's import payments by about $200 million 
in 1974-75.14. 
A useful gauge to the impact of the oil crisis on 
New Zealand's economy is provided when one considers that 
oil supplies during the third quarter of 1974 cost as much 
as the total bill for oil imports in 1973, 15. Clearly 
the New Zealand economy will face serious problems if the 
current account deficit continues to increase during 
1975-76. In this case, all sectors iri the economy 
would have to accept lower increases in real income than 
experienced in recent years. There is no doubt that the 
impact of the oil crisis has made a significant contribution 
Table 11 · 
NEW ZEALAND'S OVERSEAS EXCHf_l}:~Q~~§AC'11IONS 
Receipts 
Export receipts 
Invisible receipts 
Total current re~eipts 
Total capital receipts 
Tote.I receipts 
Payments 
Import payments. 
Invisible payments. 
Total current payments 
Total capital payments 
T.otal payments 
Current account balance 
Capital account balance 
Overall balance 
Overseas reserves as at end 
of period 
Export Receipts 
(a) Milk products. 
· Butter 
Cheese 
.Other 
.(b.) Other animal products 
Meat 
Wool 
.Other 
(ri) Forest products 
(d) Other primary products 
.(e.) Miscellaneous 
Total export receipts 
Import Payments 
(a) Oil products 
(b) Non-oil products 
Total import payments 
June. Years ($million) 
1971...:72 1972,...3 . 197 3-4 
l.,387 
.266 
1;653 
. 288 
. 1,960 
1;073 
450 
1,5.23 
· .. 147 
. 1;670 
130 
. 141 .. 
271. 
. 758 
. 145 
. 72 
.110 
448 
: 253. 
105 
. 89 . 
55 
.· 112. 
1.,387 
. 86 
987. 
1;073 
1,7.73 
. 350 
. 2 ,12 3 
.. 19.1 . 
. 2,J14 . 
1,249 
. 549 
1,798 
. 18.4 
1,983 . 
. 325 
:7 
. 332 
. 1-.·094 
. 10.6 
64 
. 140 
586 
. 436 
138 
97 
: 70 
137 
1;773 
1:, 7 48 
.· 424 
2.,172 
204 
2 ,376 
1,849 
656 
. 2 ,505 
265 
2.,.771 
,...._334 
-61 . 
,....395 
594 
. 109 
58 
1.47 
565 
. 371 . 
127 
12.0. 
; 70 
18.0 
. 1 ;.748 
.. 98 168 
.· 1,.15.1. . 1,681 
. 1 ' 2 49 . 1 ' 8 4 9 
56 
SOURCE: R.J". Tizard, The Economic Situation, October, 1974 
p .. 41 .. 
to the worsening position of the New Zealand economy. 
The direct .threats· to New Zealand's. prosperity and 
economic welfare as a result of the oil crisis have resulted 
in some considerable ·activity to offset those threats. 
This activity has beeri coriceritrated in thre~ main areas: 
trade, the more efficient utilization of New Zealand's 
energy resources, and diplomatic activity. 
5 7 
The increased 
diplomatic activity. undertaken by New Zealand as a result 
of the oil crisis, while having some effects upon New 
Zealand 1.s economic welfare,.· has been predominantly. concerned 
with New Zealand 1 s idealistic and ~d~ntity objec'ti ves and 
will be considered under that category. 
One of the most obvious. con.sequences of the oil 
crisis has .been the. creation of a New Zealand interest in 
trade with.the Middle Ea~t. Befor~ the oil ·crisis the 
Middle East was not ".of. great importance to New Zealand.' s 
external t;roade. The value ·of New Zealand 1 s. exports to 
Egypt, Iran, Libya, I.raq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, .the United 
Arab Emirates, and Israel for the year ended June, 1973, 
. totalled NZ$7 ,320 ,497 or about .o •. 41 ·percent of New Zealand 1 s 
Table 12 
VALUES OF EXPORTS OF NEW ZEALAND PRODUCE TO MIDDLE EASTERN 
COUNTRIES 
Egypt 
·Iran 
Iraq 
Kuwait 
Saudi Arabia 
· United Arab Emirates 
Israel 
for year ended June 19.73 
.$14T, 867 
·. $5 '740 ,122 
$234,820 
$342 ,667 
$423' 722 
$188,269 
. $2.43,030 
New Zealand's. total exports for the same period -
'$1,754 ,642 ,950 
SOURCE: Country Analyses of External Trade, (WelliI}gton, 
Department of Statistics,· 1g74) 
total. eXports for the period (see Table 12). Now,. .the 
Middle East, la!'gely as a res.ult of the swiftest· ·transfer 
of money in history - the 13 OPEC countries earned US$112 
\Di'llion d.uring 1974 - has become ·an increasingly attract-
ive market for New Zealand. The position was summed up 
by a government trade official who said, "they've. got the 
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population and now they have. got th~ money to buy our 
goods. Added sales to the area make. good business sense 
whether we negotiate oil deals or not n. 16. 
New. Zealand was in the process .of establishi~1g 
trade relations with Iran before the ·outbreal{ of the .4th 
Arab-Israeli conflict and the oil crisis. In September 
1973, during a session of the UN General Assembly, New 
Zealand's ·Prime Minister, Mr Kirk," met the Iranian 
Minister of For·eign Affairs; Mr Khalatbari, and discussed 
the possibility of developing closer. relations between 
the two countries. The meeti~g was at the initiative of 
the Iranian Fore~gn Minist·er, 17, and when it was 
:s~ggested that a New Zealand Minister should visit Iran, 
Mr Kirk expressed his interes·t in the s~ggestion. 
Two points are worthi of note here. First, the 
initiative for the establishment of New Zealand-Iranian 
relations came from Iran rather than New Zealand, and, 
secondly, that ·Iran, while ·a Middle Eastern count_ry, is 
also a non-Arab country. Thus, the development of 
relations with ·Iran would not have been irreconcilable 
with New Zealand's hist·ory of support for Israel ~gainst 
her Arab neighbour.s. 
The' next St?-ge in the developi:nent of New Zealand Is 
.relationship with Iran came in January· 1974, when the 
· Minister .of Finance Mr Rowling, accompanied by Mr· N .V. 
Lo~gh; Deputy Secretary to the Treasury, spent three days 
in Iran as a. guest of the Iranian Governmen.t. Then, 
during April 197L1, a nine--man Iranian economic mission led 
by the Deputy Minister of the Economy, .Mr Hassan Ali 
Mehran, spent five days in New Zealand. The mission 
discussed trade and economic co-operation between the two 
countries - including meat supplies, technical co-operation, 
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investment, and the possibility of a bilateral trade !=lgree-
ment - with the Ministers of Trade and Industry, 
Agriculture and Fisher·ies, .and Overseas Trade as well as 
the private sector and .officials .of Government departments 
and the Reserve Bank. Mr Mehran also called on the Prime 
Minister. 18. At the end of May 1974, a New Zealand five-
man ec·onomic mission led by Mr K .J'. Futt·er, Deputy Secretary 
of Trade and Industry,. visited Tehian. for follow~up 
discussions. Mr Futter had talks with the Iranian 
Ministers of Economy, j\griculture, .Finance and Commerce, 
and with their officials. New Zealand's Minister of 
Overseas Trade and Associate Minister of Fore~g~ Affairs, 
Economy, and Trade and Industry, Mr Walding had an 
audience with the Shah of Iran, the first time that the 
Shah had· received a New Zealand Minister. 1.9. Mr Walding's 
visit followed by a week the announcement that the Shah, 
accompanied by Empress Farah, would visit New Zealand later 
in 197.4. The Shah and Empress did, in fact, visit New 
· Zealand from 27 to. 30 September, 197.4. On 30 September, 
1974, a trade agreement between New Zealand and Iran was 
s~gned by the New Zealand Prime Minister, Mr· Rowlii;ig, and 
.the Iranian Minister of F'oreign Affairs, Mr Khalatbari, in 
the presence of the New Zealand Cabinet and the Shah of 
\ 
Iran. The ~greement includes two schedules of the type 
.of exports of each country which will receive particular 
,attention in. future "trade between the two countries. 
Petroleum was not included in the list of exports nominated 
by ·Iran, al though this w~uld not prevent supply arra!J.ge-
ments ·from bei!J.g discussed in the regular consultations of 
the· joint commission for trade and economic development. 
The pre-visit speculation abtiut the Shah providing plenty 
of cheap oil in return for mutton has not been realized; 
trade treaties seldom deliver overnight. 
While New Zealand has failed to receive cheap oil 
supplies from Iran, trade between the two countries has 
increased dramatically. New Zealand exports to Iran in 
1971..:72 were worth $2 millio.n. For the year endi~g June 
1973, exports to Iran totalled $5.7 millio.n ... However, 
between 1 .October, .1973, and 30 June; 197 4, ·Iran ranked 
fifth amo~g importers of New Zealand me~t, taki~.g about 
12.,310 tons -. mainly· mutto.n· .. For.the year ending June, 
1974, New Zea.land's exports to Iran had nearly trebled and 
were ·worth $17 millio.n.. Ne~ Zealand's b~ggest salei were 
(in order) mutton, wool, live ~heep, skim milk powder and 
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beef. New Zealand 1 s. trade ·with Iran has continued to. grow 
and by August, 1974, Iran had bo~ght 6,000 .tons of lamb and 
14, 000 tons of mutton from New Zealand .. 20. . Under the 
trade ~greement it is hoped that sales wiil continue to 
increase and has been estimated that. the f~gure may rise to 
about 50, ooo tons a year. 21 .. 
I 
The :shipments of live sheep 
to Iran have, however, caused some considerable controversy • 
. Concern about the loss of work. for New Zealand sla~ghtermen, 
allied with allegations of cruelty to the sheep in transit,. 
led to a ban by the Meat Workers Union on live sheep 
shipments .to Iran. The ·continuation of this ban could 
hinder future meat deals with :Iran, but the Minister of 
Agriculture, Mr Moyle, .has hinted that the Government is 
prepared to consider the export of live shee,p. Mr Moyle 
said that Middle Eastern countries had apparently delayed 
buyi!Jg ·frozen meat because they hoped to obtain live sheep 
shipments, and since October, when the ban was imposed, the 
terms of trade had declined further, .and t{he trade with Iran 
in. froz~n meat had not developed as much as h~ had hoped. a2. 
The Minister said that the Government was keeping the 
situation under review and might consider allowing shipments 
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where they were clearly in the national interest. 
It is very clear, then, that Iran could well be a 
major new market for New Zealand shee·pmeats. The oil 
crisis helped this development in two main way.s. The oil 
price ~ises provided Iran with th~ capita~ with which to 
purchase additional New Zealand products, and the prospect 
of a shortfall of Arab oil supplies prompted New Zealand to 
examine the potential for receiving.greater supplies of 
Iranian oil. There is no doubt: that oil was one of the 
major reasons behind the development of· New Zealand's 
relationship with Iran. Even when Mr Kirk first expressed 
his interest in dev'eloping a New Zeala.nd--'Iranian friendship 
he said that 11 New Zea.land will be interested not only for 
what .it can sell to Iran but also in the possibility of 
developing some contractual basis that would assure this 
\ 
country of an adequate supply of crude oil in the event of 
some shOrt?-ge developing 11 • 23. AlthOygh New Zealand is 
not yet· awash in Iranian~oil, the dramatic increase in the 
trade between the two. countries is a beneficial spin-off, 
and, in the long run, may prove of more importance than 
the ·immediate need for Iranian oil. 
New Zealand's. growi~g trade interest in the Middle 
East has not been: confined only to Iran. · Tn January 1974 
it was announced that a New Zealand. goodwill mission would 
visit .certain Arab stat~~. Th~ ~ission com~rising Mr J.V. 
Scott, Deputy Secretary of Fore~gn Affairs; Mr P.N. 
Holloway, Ambassador in Rome and a former Minister of 
Industries and Commerce; and Mr· E.R. Woods, of the Ministry 
Of Foreign Affairs, visited the Middle East fro~ 1 to 26 
February. The countries visited were Egypt, Lebanon, 
Syria, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrein, 
Kuwait, and Iraq. A visit to Saudi Arabia was not possible 
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because of the other commitments of the Saudi Arabian 
officials. 24. Th~ mission's basic objective was simply 
to establish friendly relations with the countries visited. 
The mission also had useful discussions on trade and 
technical co-operation. It was established that. there was 
clearly scope for the development of mutually beneficial 
economic relations between New Zealand and the countries 
visite.d. The main areas for· development were h~gh....:quality 
protein foods - meat and dairy products .., timber products 
and manufactured_ goods . In addition, .. it b~~ame ·clear to 
. , 
the mission that New Zealand had much that could be useful 
to the countries concerned in the forin .of technical 
expertise - in pasture management, soil science, animal 
husbandry, and forestry. 25. 
Then, in April 1974, teams from the Meat Exporters 
Council, from the Dairy Board, and from Asian New Zealand 
Development Consultants Ltd, (ANZDEC), paid visits to the 
Middle Eas.t. The trade commissioners from Athens and New 
Delhi were associated with the meat and dairy missions. 26. 
These. visits. confirmed. the potential in the Middle East. for 
meat, dairy products, and agricultural and other expertise. 
The report of the· joint w.ission from the New Zealand Meat 
-
Board and the Meat Exporters Councl.l said that apart from 
the State-tradi~g countries - particularly Egypt and Syria 
- _there appeared to be no. fori:nidable barriers preventi~g 
free trade with the ar~a. 2.7. 
On 16 June, l974, the Libyan Minister of 
Agriculture, Mr Al Gaoud, arrived in Wellington for three 
days of talks with the New Zealand Gove~nment, producer 
boa:r•ds, and other agricultural organizations. He had 
d:lscussions with the Minister of Agriculture and Pisheries, 
Mr C.J. Moyle, and the Minister of Overseas Trade and 
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Assoc1ate Minister. of Foreign Af'fair·s, Mr Walding, and 
their officials. · Mr Gaotid was especially interested in 
the possibility of getti~g help with problems of sheep 
man~gement as well as the possibility of imports of New 
Zealand lam.b. Mr Gaoud also met representatives of the 
Meat Producers Board, the Dairy Board, the· Stock and 
Station Agents Association, .and other private sector 
concerns. The visit, the first s~gnificant .contact .there 
had been between Libya and New Zealand, showed that the 
scope for mutual b~ri~fit exista in Ne~ Zealand'~ relations 
with Libya. 
In August, 1974, a .four-man delegation from Iraq 
visited New Zealand as. guests of the Government. The 
del~gation, all represeritati ves of the .State Company for 
Agricultural Production, had intensive discussions about 
the supply of New Zealand meat to Iraq, and two multi-
million dollar agree~ents were reached. O~ 7 A~gust the 
mission bought 1,200 tonnes of New Zealand lamb, and on 8 
A~gust the mission s~gned a 5·, 000~-tonne. c·ontract for four 
shipments of mutton and lamb within six months. The two 
contracts were the first sales of meat to Iraq by New 
Zealan.d. The contracts were, however, only a short-term 
measure as Iraq, an agricultural .country, had been 
suf'feri~g severe climatic problems. Nevertheless, the 
del~gation said that Iraq was interested in New Zealand 
meat and dairy products, .and in return would come supplies 
.of oil, sulphur, and dates. The leader of the delegation, 
·Mr S.M. Kassir, said he hoped the visit would be the fore-
runner of a two-way flow of trade between Iraq and New 
Zealand. 2 8. 
The establishment of diplomatic relations with 
Egypt and the re-opening of the Suez Canal could also pave 
the way for new trade opportunities in the Middle East. 
While .it seems that, because of Egypt's serious. financial 
problems, initial progress will be slow, ~gypt 's. 38 
million people are obviously a potentially h~ge market. 
New Zealand concerns are already invest·~gating prospects 
in ~gyp_t :, rn· November' 197 4 'the Dairy Board Is. general 
man!lger visited Cairo and he was followed closely by the 
sales manager of the. Auckland Farmers' Freezi~g .Company. 
According to New Zealand's first Ambassador .to ·cairo, Mr 
P .N. Holloway, 0 ther·e is a strong probability that we. can 
open up trade with Egypt, something which has been 
virtually non-existent since the Suez Canal closed. 11 2.9. 
Mr Holloway acknowledged that the immediate prospects are 
not as_ good as with Iran or Iraq because of the econo~ic 
situation, but tho~ght that there were_ good long~term 
opportunities. for sales of been and sheepmeats. 
There is no s~gn that the new trade interest in the 
Middle East will be only a brief phenomenon .. 3.0. Increased 
trade between the Middle East and New Zealand appears 
almost certain to continue. The main problem dces not 
appear to be the lack of markets but rather the lack of 
facilitie.s. The various meat board missions have 
reported the lack of facilities for handling frozen meat 
as a niaj or obstacle to trade in the are.a. The provision 
.of a~ more efficient shippi~g service to the Persian Gulf 
ports will also be vital to the future development of New 
Ze~land's meat trade with the Middle East. 
It is interesting to note here the· change in 
attitudes of some of New Zealand's leading business 
ex·ecuti ves since the oil crisis. A survey of 341 ·1eading 
business executives carried out in October, 1973, but before 
the Oil crisis, showed that most thought that Japan would 
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have. the most impact on New Zealand's economic well-bei~g 
in the 1980 '.s .. 31; · Japan (35%) was followed by the EEC 
( 23%), Australia ( 18%), South East Asia. (11%), USA (5%), 
China .(2%), and other countries (1-%). However, a survey 
of tho::;e same 341 .business executives. in October, 1974 
revealed a rather. changed outlook. In response to the 
question - which country .do you think will have the' most 
impact on· New Zealand's .. economic well-bei~g by 1985? - the 
Middle East sudderily appeared in .fourth position with 11% 
pf the replies. 'Th~ EEC topped the list with. 30%, 
followed by Australia ( 20%), Japan (14%), ,the Middle East 
.(11%), USA (10%), .South East Asia {8%), .the British Isles 
.( 3%) , China ( 2-%) , and other countries .( 2%:) • 
Further trade prospects with the Arabian Gulf states 
will be explored by a New Zealand delegation .for three 
weeks in March and April of 197.5. The. team plans to visit 
s.everal countries in the area, all of which have virtually 
no domestic manufacturi!'lg and import. up to 95 percent of 
all types of .commodi tie.s. The mission is bei~g o!'ganized 
by the Export Institute: of New Zealand with the backi~g of 
the Manufacturers Federation and th~ Department of Trade 
and Industry. Delegation members ple.n to be in the area 
from 13 March to 7 April .. 32. 
The oi.1 crisis has also affected New Zealand's 
attitudes towards the utilization of ene!'gy resource.s. 
While few of the world's de~eloped nations had shown much 
foresight in developi!'lg and utilizing the world's energy 
resources, New Zealand had been worse than mos.t. Because 
oil, electricity, and .even coa.l had been so cheap, New 
Zealand used them a,t will without rega.rd to efficient 
utilization. Whi.le conditions prevailed this reaction was 
tmderstandable. 
The o:tl cr:i.sis has ch<:mged that situation, however 
. ' 
and the era of abundant and cheap ene?'.'gy has ende.d. No 
lo!lger can New Zealand (or a.ny other country) afford to 
waste ene~gy. It did not take very .long for the oil 
·crisis to bri!lg about a change in th.inking on the. ·ruture 
development of New Zealand's. ene~gy resources. One 
observer noted that "if there. has been one lesson from the 
petrol ·crisis and the related problems it has ·bro).lght it is 
that our energy resources: are precious and. finite and that 
usi!lg them to the best advant?-ge will need close ·co-
ordinationrr .. 33. 
Initially, .it was thO~ght that New Zealand would be 
subjected to a 20 percent cut in oil supplies for· 197.4. A 
reductiori of this magnitude would have had serious effects 
on ?-gricultural and industrial production and a number of 
.steps were taken u~gently. Measures~ to reduce consumption 
were of prime importance. The Ministry pf Energy 
Resources convened a committee ·comprisi1:J.g a wide ra-!1ge of 
Government depa,rtments, and working parties were 
established to .evaluate the savi!lgs which could be made by 
the adoption of certain practices .. 34. 
Over a period of weeks the 'Government instituted 
the. followi!lg measures: (a) a 50 m.p.h.· maximum speed 
limit; .(b) a ban on 'week-end' petrol 
sales after noon on Saturday . 
. (c) 'Anti .. -hoardil:J.g' r~gulations; 
(d) re~trictions on the sale of 
bunker fuels to r~gular. contracted customers in minimum 
quantities only; (~) restrictions on the sale of 
diesel and fuel oils to 1973 levels; 
(.f) .control of aviation fuel 
~g) a limitatiori on oil-fired 
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electricity. generation; 
(h) restrictions. on the sale of 'comfort heati~g' 
fuels to 93 percent of 1973 levels; 
(i) restrictions. on the sale of bitumen to 95 
percerit of 1973 leveis. 35. 
At the same time industrial consumers were 
encour?-ged to give serious consideration .to s.ubstituting 
coal and natural. gas for oil, and several .studies were 
carried out to determine .the scope .·for· such substitutio.n. 
On 8 February, 1974, the Minister of Ene!'gy Resources, Mr 
·Freer, announced that the Governmerit had offered financial 
assistance to manufacturers of hOme-heati!J.g appliance.s. 
This was to enable them to perfect the adaption of oil-
fired home heati!J.g units. being mapufactured for use with 
alternative £uels. This was done to enable home 
appliances which used oil to be converted, .if necessary to 
natural or bottled. gas. 
Steps were also taken to explore avenues. of supply 
other than from the ·international oil companies. These 
included discussions at ministerial. level with .the 
Australian Government to ensure .the· continuation .of full 
supplies of petroleum products. froni that country. 
--
Discussions were ~lso held on the possibility of 
additional diesel oil bej_!1g made .available from Australia 
.should New Zealand's stocks. deteriorate. to the point that 
~gricultural and industrial production were likely to. be 
seriously affect~d. 
While the oil ·crisis led to a .concerted effect by 
the New Zealand Government to reduce consumption of fuels, 
it also resulted in an increased activity in the field of 
exploration for. fuels. Before th~ oil crisis, oil 
exploration on land had slowed down, largely because of 
the expiry of a nurr«ber of' petroleum licences, and it had 
slowed down offshore because of the non-availability of' an 
appropriate oil drilling rig. In the past oil explor-
ation in Ne0 Zealand had b~~h at the will of th~ oil 
companies and if they decided to cea;se exploration then 
the· search came to a standstill. · · Previous New Zealand 
Governments tended to ·accept this state ·of affairs and as 
a result oil exploration in New· Zea:land has tended to be 
rather spasmodic .. Even when the Maui_ gas field was 
discovered there was an inordinate delay before an agree-
ment was s~gned. 
New Zealand's ene?'.'gy reserves have .been the subject 
of extensive political manoeuver:j_ng since the ·first Labour 
government. With the acquisition of a number of coal 
mines and later; the purchase of a. 52 percent interest in 
BP, the· Labour Party bas always been: committed to. the 
belief that a country ha·s to have. a stake ·in its ene?'.'gY 
reserves, .bOth as an income earner and for national 
eme~--gencies. · .The National Party, however, has not adopted 
the same philosophy. Instead they have. felt: that it 
sLould be left to private. enterprise to develop New 
Zealand 1 s energy resource:s·. For ex.ample, wheh coal lost 
favour successive National G.overnments clos·ed down 
uneconomic mines rather than look for alternative uses. 
When the La.hour Party won the.· 19.72 .General Election they 
said that they would ensure th2~t ene?'.'gy resources would be 
properly exploited. .It is to the· credit of the· Labour 
Government that it kept an election promise and bought a 
half share in the Maui field, which ·certainly now looks 
like a reasonable buy. 
Further activity in th~ field of oil exploration 
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has been rather slow~r. On 6 December,. 1973, Dr .. C.J. 
Maiden, Vice-Chancellor of Auckland University, .said that 
"the Government should speed up the· search for offshore 
oil. The Maui field cannot exist in isolation and there 
are probably additional~ very significant, natural_ gas and 
oil resources waiting to be found in and around New 
Zealandu .. 36. The man~ging director of Mobil Oil NZ Ltd, 
· Mr .G. Duncan, has said that he .beli.ev·es a lot more oil 
exists in New Zealand than has so f'ar been discovere.d. 
An American oil expert, Mr Keri Brunot; of the National 
Science Founda.tion, wheri he was in New Zealand under the 
New Zealand-United States bilateral energy ?,greement, said 
that he was amazed at the extent of New Zealand 1 s. 
continental shelf and felt that New Zealand could have 
undersea petroleum resources la?'."'ge eno~1gh to be s~gnificant 
by world standards .. 37, Maui oilmen calculate that the 
chances for a successful .strike are one in nine, .while the 
odds for a commercial strike are one in twenty-five. 
However, despite these optimistic opinions, pil exploration 
has almost .been at a standstill. This has been largely 
bi:>cause the oil companies were not prepared to invest h~ge 
.sums into exploration until they" knew the· New Zealand 
G.overnment rs. attitude towards nevi discoveries. There has 
been a worldwide trend for Governments to ·acquire a larger 
interest in oil and_ gas discoveries, and, with Labour's 
philosophy of state involvement, .this has meant that oil 
exploration in New Zea.land was delayed until an.official 
policy became availabl.e. The oil companies were not 
prepared to invest heavily in new exploration ventures 
only to have the_ government take over the successful 
ventures and therefore enjoy a substantial 'carried free' 
interest on di.scovery. The oil companies position was 
outlined by the chairman of the New Zealand Petroleum 
Company, Mr C. c·. Shepherd., .in October, 197 4, when he 
said that "we can only await the announcement of. full 
d t . . 1 f th 'G t I . l'. It . 8 e ai s o . e overnmen s. new po icy •. 3 • 
The Government has not cha!lged its. view that New 
Zea.land's resources shOuld be exploited in the interest of 
the nation with Government participati.o.n. The Govern-
ment has now tabled the Petroleum Amendment Bill, N.o .:2. 
Th.e ·proposed legislati.on tightens a n·umber of provisions 
in the 1937 Act which have pr.oven "unduly advant?-geous u 
to the prospecting companies, and leaves open the d~gree 
.to which the Government. can demand participation in 
development of any discoveri.es. Not surprisi~gly, the 
oil companies have been rather critical of the proposed 
nevi l~g1slation. 
Possibly motivated by fears of a boycott. inspired 
by the to)-lgh provisions of the new Pet.rolelim Amendment 
Bill, the Government offered, on 29 November, 197 L~., to 
take part in the development of any offshore petroleum 
discoveries made by the Penrod 74 and Glomar Tasman 
drilling rigs, which will begin drilling in 1975. The 
special offer· was made only to those prospectors known 
to have been arranging for the Penrod 74 and Glomar 
Tasman to begin dri.lling programmes in areas covered by 
existi~g licences. These licences, due to ~xpire in 
October' 1975, will be renewed to any petroleum prospector 
who accepted the offer which committed .the Government to 
meeting 40 percent of the prospecting costs and 
.subsequen.tly ent.itled it to rece1ve a 51 percent i.nterest 
in the development of an;y successful discovery. 'l'he 51 
percent was to ensure that the Government had the 
controlling interest in developing valuable indigenous 
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ene!'gy resources for the benefit .of the country as a whole. 
It appe2.rs, then, tha,t the oil ·crisis has forced 
the New Zealand Government to. formulate an official policy 
.of .state involvement in the search for, and development of' 
oil as well as providing added impetus for further 
exploration in an attempt to lower New Zealand's 
dependence upon imported oil supplies. 
The oil ·crisis al:::o ha~d some s;tgnificant effects on 
New Zealand's attiti1des towards. the utilization .of sources 
of ene!'gy other than oil. The. former Minister of 
Electri.ci ty, Mr .T. McGuigan, .has stated that to. cope with 
future electricity demand. New Zealand 11will have to turn, 
increasingly, .to. thermal_ gerier;ation_n .. 39. '11he Government 
has revised plans for a $65 million power station at 
Marsden Point, so that it can be· fired by either coal or 
oil; .rather than just oil as was pla.nne.d. 4:0 .. · This move 
will boost the cost of the station well ab.ove the or;Lginal 
estimate of $65 million. · In the· ·search. for· more 
electricity. the Government ha~s approvec;l in principle one 
of the largest development proposals undertaken in New 
Zealand -· a $340 million scheme to install six hydro-
electricity. dams on the Clutha and Kawarau rivers in 
Central Ot?-go. These dams will have a maximum output of 
1490 megawatts, or about double .the: :ob.tp~ut of Manapour.i .• ' 
The :reports of the Committee to Re1.dew .Pow·er Requirements 
and the Planning Committee on Electric Power Dev~lopment, 
tabled in June, 197 ~-, .said that power plans were being 
reassessed to depenc;l more on coal and less on oil. 
Accordingly, urgent priority is being given to studies of 
how soon a South Island coal-fired electricity station can 
be built. The Government has also. given the Electricity 
Depa:('tment approval to build the Ohau B and Ohau C power 
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stations, .the final st?-ges of the. Upper Waitaki. hydro-
project. Both will be .21Z~~gawatt stations. In 
addition the conservation of existing electricity 
supplies has become important. The dry spell which 
caused nationwide power short?-ges in 197~ made electrj_c-
ity. consumers more aware of the need to cut wast?-ge and 
.to use electricity more efficiently. In addition the 
Government has been looking at me~sures such as the 
imposition of a high sales tax on the sale of some 
window-t;ype air ·con.di tioning uni ts which are believed 
to use an excessive amoun.t of electricity. On 24 
December~ 197 4, the Minister of Electricity, Mr R. 
Bailey, expressed his concern and felt "that the public 
of' New Zealand should be made more aware of the energy 
crisis which could face us unless we embark on some form 
of power conservatio.n. I feel the time has come to 
take a. good, long, hard look at conservation in this 
area".· 41. 
As a result of the oil crisis .New Zealand's 
natural. gas fields have assumed a. greater importance. 
'11he crisis. gave fresh impetus to the j_dea of a petro-
chemical industry as the increased costs pf overseas 
supplies could make a local industry. viable. Proposals 
for a mul ti-·million dollar methanol extraction plant 
usi~g Maui gas have also been put to Government. 
Methanol is the simplest alcohol which can be produced 
. from natural. gas and it has a wide application. The 
production of methanol would not only supplement New 
Zealand's liquid fuel requirements but also provide a 
che~ical feedstock for existing industries. 42. The 
oil crisis has also raised the possibility of usi~g 
liquified petroleum. gas (LPG) as an alternative to the 
traditional electricity and more recently natural, gas. 
A short!=lge of electricity and the much-increased 
cost of oil imports. have naturally stirred interest in 
coal. The Government's policy to use coal as a saver 
of oil is well known. As early as 10. December, 1973, 
the Government authorized the Minister of Mines, Mr F. 
Colman, to increase coal production as a part of the 
campaign to reduce the .reliance on imported fue.l. On 6 
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March, 197 ~-, J'lir Colman told a coal industry neli'is media 
seminar that many industrial concerns. were ~esponding to 
the Governrr1ent 's suggestion that more use be made of coal. 
The draft of a proposed White Paper on the New Zealand 
coal industry was near completiori when th~ reduction in 
oil supplies and the price rises_ for crude oil occurred. 
The oil crisis radically changed some of the assumptions 
in the initial draft and it was nec·essary to review a 
la~ge section of th~ draft pap~~. 43. The White Paper, 
which stro~gly advocated the_ greater use of coal, was 
tabled in Parliament on 26 September, ig7_11. The 
possibility of deriving oil and oil by-products from.coal 
has also been suggested. However, ."tentative ~conomics 
favour very la~ge scale plants, far larger than would be 
feasible in New Zealand". 44. 
The possibility. of New Zealand usi~g nuclear power 
has also become a topic of much discussion since the oil 
crisis. Official statements on the date ~hen New 
Zealand will begin using nuclear power have ~aried wildly, 
but it seems that New Zealand will not have to u.se 
nuclear electricity~ generation before the 1990's. 
The energy crisis has prompted discussion on the 
use of solar energy. · However, the DSIR has been working 
on a copper and steel solar heating unit si.nce 1957 and 
has still not come up with an economically .competitive 
form of solar energy. Nevertheless,· research has been 
accelerated by the oil ·crisis and a breakthro)-1.gh may 
soon appear. New Zealand might also possess a much 
greater potentia.l for. geothermal steam development than 
had beeh previously thought. 11 The Member of Parliament 
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for Taupo, Mr J.W~ Ridley, ~as suggested to an internation-
al conference on_ .geothermal power at Wairakei that the 
potential of steam power in New Zealand is much greater 
than bad been appreciated". 4:5. There is no doubt that 
the fuel crisis has dramatically cha~ged the position and 
the erstwhile pessimism has. gon.e. 
The oil crisis has also tri~gered off several 
.other notable areas of activity. On 29. April, 1974, the 
Minister of Trade and Industry, Mr Freer, announced that 
the .G.overnment was setti:~1g up an award scI?-eme for firms 
which save resources or make. better use of them. 
Perhaps the most important step, however, was the 
establishment of the Ene!'gy Research and Development 
Committee, headed by Dr ~c.J. Maiden, to. guide New·zealand 
on a more self-sufficient ene!'gy policy. On 27 February 
197L~, Prime Minister Kirk signed an Agreement for 
Scientific and Technical Co-·operation witb the United 
State.s. ttThe initial emphasis under that ~greement is 
to be on energy research and it was to administer the New 
Zealand side of the !igreement, for which Dr Maiden is 
agent, that the Energy Research and Development Committee 
was established-". 46. The Cotnmittee was allocated a 
budget of $500,000 for the first year, but this could be 
increased - to p6ssibly several million dollars - in the 
future. On 3 November,. 197L1, the Committee announced 
research grants of $247,000. A.grant of $89,lrno ·was 
made to a team of scientists from Lincoln College, the 
Cawthron Institute,and the University of Auckland for a 
project to improve the economics of producing alcohol and 
methane from such crops as sugar beet,wood,and grain as a 
replacement for petrol in cars and trucks. 
It is very obvious,then,that the oil crisis has serv-
ed to revitalize enthusiasm for the possible development of 
alternative energy resources in New Zealand. New Zealand is 
well endowed with energy resources and the oil crisis has 
made quite clear the need to develop spme of these resources. 
If policy makers take this opportunity, the oil crisis may 
well prove to be a blessing in disguise for the future, 
planned development and efficient utilization of New Zealand's 
energy resources. 
When confronted with direct threats to its economic 
and prosperity objectives a country can usually react and try 
to offset those threats. However, indirect threats usually 
cannot be offset so readily. This is especially true of a 
small state. The indirect threats to New Zealand's economic 
and prosperity objectives as a result of the oil crisis are 
the result of the extreme pressure which has been placed on 
the world's monetary system and the consequent instability 
of world trade. 
The fourfold increase in the price of oil in the 
fourth quarter of 1973 brought with it sweeping changes 
to the international distribution of income and the balance 
of payments situation. The oil producing nations' 'take' 
from a barrel of oil, less than US$1 at the start of the 
1970's, was lifted from US$1.76 before the 4th Arab-
Israeli war to US$3.03 at the end of 1973, and to more than 
US$7.oo from 1 January 1974. 47. The result has been the 
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greate.st and swiftest transfer of wealth in all history; 
the OPEC countries earned US$112 billion from the rest of 
the world in 197 ~·. The producing. government 'take'. from 
oil has risen to levels at which certain Middle Eastern 
countries can no lo~ger spend their revenues and the 
world face~ serious proble~s in dealing with the massive 
surplus .of. funds. Because the oil produci~g countries 
could not spend it all,. they ran up a payments surplus of 
US$6o billion in 197:Lf. This sudden· shift of money has 
shaken the whole. fr?-gile structure of. the international 
financial system, severely weakened the already inflation 
troubled economies of the oil-importing nations and 
given. great new politic al strength to the oil exporter.s. 
The da!J.ger in this si tuatj.on is that individual 
countries may tr;y to i.mprove their own balance of payments 
positions by restricti!Jg imports or devalui!J.g in an 
atteIT.pt to reduce their deficits at. the expense of the 
other deficit countries. This could lead to a 
contraction of world trade. The dange'r of a. global 
· recession then exists because as peOple spend more on oil, 
they have less money left with which to purchase other 
requirements . 
.It is obvious, then, that the sudde-n, sharp rise 
in oil prices has ?-ggravatea. all sorts of problems, 
increased tendencies towards government controls, 
intensified nationalism and called into question the 
future of free ~conomie~. Suddenly the possibility that 
the international system rn~ght break down existed. 
However, not all of the world's e~onomic malaise can be 
blamed on the increased oil prices. · NeverthelesB, to 
battle i.nflation, which was. given a boost by the 
increased oil prjces, all Western nations clan~ped on 
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.restrictive. bu~get and credit policies, causj_!lg their 
economies to slow down simultaneously for the first time 
since the 1930'.s. 
The drastic worsening of the balance of payments 
situation of the oil importing countries bro~ght about 
by the h~gher oil prices will not be remedied by normal 
adaptive measures such as expansion oriented fiscal and 
monetary inte.rvention and currency revaluations in the 
abundant oil..:producing countries or, alternatively, 
internal restrict;i.ons and currency devaluations in the 
adversely affected oil-importi~g countrie.s. Any 
improvement in the .current account balances of the oil-
importi!lg nations relative to the exporting countries 
i.s not likely, at least in the short ter.m. 
As a result several plan~ which aim to come to 
grips with the mass~ve shift pf economic wealth to the 
-OPEC countries have been suggested and debated. 
J"ohannes Wi tteveen, head of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), has put forward a plan whi.ch calls for the 
creation of an 'oil. facility 1 at the IMF which accepts 
deposits from the oil producers and then lends that 
Jlloney at a ba!.,gain interest rate of 7 percen.t. 
·Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healey, has 
proposed a plan which calls. for a recycling bank similar· 
to the IJ.VIIi'' s, but which would pay interest at commercial 
rates to attract more OPEC deposits. American 
Secretary of State, Dr Henry Kissinger, has prop~sed a 
$25 billion 'safety net' lending agency which would be 
funded by consuming nations. Member countries strapped 
by h~gh oil-import bills could borrow from th~ fund in 
eme!'gencies, if they agree to energy conservatio.n. The 
Secretary-General of the. 24 naticn Organization for 
Econom:i.c Co-·operation and Development (OECD), Emile. van 
Lennep, proposed a similar plan to th~ Xissi~ger plan 
except that the loans would be guaranteed by the OECD. 
Obviously New Zealand's economic and prosperity 
objectives. would be threatened by any world economic 
re cessio.n. A slump in the ·.economies of New Zealand 1 s 
major tra.ding partners - the. United Kingdom, United 
States of America, and Japan - would be passed on 
thro)Jgh the channels of international trade. The 
'multiplier' effect of a reduced loss of income by 
exporters, leading to a reduced demand for New Zealand 
labour and so further reducing incomes~ m~ght lead to a 
very rapid contraction of purch2~sing power. .It is not 
surprisi~g, then, that Nevi Zealand, even with a balance 
of payments deficit of about $800 million (only about 
$200 million of which is oil-induced), has continued to 
act la~gely as if normal economic conditions existed. 
But New Zealand's contribution on the world :::;. cale is 
n~gligible. The indirect threats. to New Zealand's 
economic and prosperity objectives will remain serious 
until a method has been found to stabilize the world 
monetary and trade situations. Ironically, while these 
indj_rect threats provide. the. greatest potential danger to 
}Jew Zealand's economic and prosperity. objectives, it is 
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in this very area that New Zealand can be least effective. 
N.evertheless, there are signs of some. eff.ecti ve 
act1on cordng about. On 16 January, 1975, a meeting of 
the Finance Ministers of twenty countries, representi~g 
all 126 nations in the IMF', announced that they had 
reached ~greement on .certain measures to be take.n. The 
most important of these are two special funds, one within 
the IMF. for the use .of any member country which finds its 
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oil debtn intolerable, and the other, a. 'safety net 1 
reserved for industrial countries and intended only as a 
last resort. lJ8. 'l'he special IMF. fund will be, for about 
$US6 ,20.0 million borrowed from the oil-produci!1g 
countries for· relending where .it is most neede.d. About 
.$USl ,500 million of this will probably be. borrowed by 
developing countries in 1975, and for them there will be 
special cut-price interest· ra,te_s. It is hoped that 
these measures will reduce the temptation .for co-untries 
to a.ct alone to. cure paymentg deficit,s caused by 
rocketing oil bills. The Canadi.an Minister of Finance, 
Mr J. Turne1°, who was. chc:drman of the Ministerial 
conference told a news conference:· 11 I believe that our 
actions will reinf'orc.e busi:r;ess confidence around the 
world, and also reinforce the confidence of, governments". 
49. Jf this does occur then th~ indirect threat to 
New Zealand's economic and pr'osperity objectives may well 
recede somewhat. 
(III) IDEALISTIC AND IDENTI'I'Y OBJECTIVES 
The oil crisis also posed some problems with 
regards to New Zealandts idealistic and identity 
objectives. When the Arab oil producers decided .to use 
oil as a political weapon they divided the-oil-consuming 
nations into one of three. cat~gories: friends, neutrals, 
and enemies. Oil supplies were to be regulated 
according to this classification with a t.otal embargo on 
nations classified as .'e~emies 1 and normal supplies to 
those classified as 'friendly_' .. Obviously, a nation 
with a h~gh level of Arab oil imports would want .to be 
.classified as friendly in order to maintain its level of 
imports. In most cases the achievement of a 'friendly' 
classification required a concentrated diplomatic effort 
to. win favour from the Arab nations. 
Obviouol;y, New Zealand, with its· re la ti V8ly high 
dependence upon imported Middle Eastern oil, did not 
want its supplies of oil imports r·educed and a8 a 
result there has been a marked upswi!'lg j_n the levels of 
diplomatic activity b8tween New Zealand and the Middle 
East since the 4th Arab-Israeli war. Ne~ Zealand, 
la~gely because of its low profile in the Middle East 
.after the Suez affair, was regarded by the Arabs as a 
'neutral' country. How.ever·' taking .a line through New 
Zealand's t''N voting patterns and official statements 
before October, 1973, this 'neutral' classifi.cation 
seemed a little fortunate, and fairly strong ties with 
Israel still existed. 1Ihe· New Zealand Government was 
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not slow to capitalize on this sitl;,ation and by 1 
February, 1974, had desf&tched a _tgcod-will' missior:. to 
visit a number of Arab states in the Middle East and the 
Persian Gulf. The mission, led by the Deputy Secretary 
pf Fore~gn Affairs, Mr J.V. Scott, visited Lebanon, 
~gypt, Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrein, Qatar, Oman, and the 
United Arab Emirates. Prime Minister Kirk said that 
the mission aimed 11 to explore the possibilities of 
developing closer relations both political1y and in trade-". 
50. This move was a radical departure from New 
Zealand's former .low prcfile position in the Middle East 
and was undoubtedJ.y caused by the oi.l crisi:s. When 
announcing the move Mr Kirk. said that -"the mission would 
hold its discussions ?-gainst the background of current 
dornest:l.c and world concern over oil suppli.es-". 
Th~re have also been developments of particular 
note with Libya, Iraq, the United Arab Emirater-:, Egypt, 
Iran, and Israel. As was noted in the section on New 
Zea1and's. trade developments with the Middle East, in June 
197·11, New Zeuland wac. host to a visit friom the Libyan 
lViinister of State for· A.gr-icultu.ral Development, Mr Al 
Ga.oud. This was the first visit to New Zealand by a 
Libyan Minister and the Government said that it welcomed 
the visit and looked forwai 1d to. greater coni. act with 
Libya in the future. ~1. 
New .Zealand was also host .to ·a visit, .in A).lgust, 
.· 19.74, from a .four-man ·Iraqi. del~gatio.n. Altho~gh. 
primarily a trade <lel~~ation this contact with Iraq was 
also in marked contrast with the virtually non-existent 
New Zealand-Iraq relationship before the oil :crisi.s. 
As early as January, 1974, New Zealand.invited 
the Fore~gn Minister of the United Arab Emirates, Mr Saif 
Ghobash, to visit Welli~gton for a day of talks with 
Ministers and officials. This visit, the £irst to New 
: Zealand by an Arab Minister, was. greet.ed as "a signific-
ant and welcome s.tep in the development of New Zealand's 
· relations with the Arab wor1a,tt .. 52 .. 
One of the most s~gnificant diplomatic mov·es made 
by the New Zealand Government was the· decision to appoint 
an Ambassador to Egypt. 1 In January, 1974, the· ~gyptian 
• I 
Ambassador to New .Zealancf, Mr Marzouk, visited Wellington 
and had discussions with the- New Zealand Government. 
Then, in June, 1974, Prime Minister Kirk annoUn.ced that 
the New Zealand Ambassador to Italy, Mr P .N·. Holloway, 
.had been appointed concurrently Ambassador to Egypt •. 
This completed the exchange :of diplomatic representatives 
initiated when the Egyptian Ambassador in Canberra was 
accredited to New Zealand in· 1970 .. That the £irst New 
Zealand diplomatic representative to any Middle Eastern 
country was to an Arab country is very significant, 
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especially when one considers New Zealand's past history 
of pro-Israeli sympathies. 
Since the oil crisis, and the sudden emepgence of 
Iran as an important, non-Arab, oil-producer, there has 
been a steady stream of Western diplomats into Teheran. 
Altho~gh initiatives were under way before .the oil 
crisis, New Zealand was "just one of the· many countries 
which sought to woo favours from ·Iran once ·the oil crisis 
.o c.c urre.d. On 13 Dec·ember; 1973, it was announced by the 
Associate Ministe~ of For~ign Affairs, Mr Walding, that 
New Zealand and Iran had established diplomatic relations . 
. It was announced that Mr Hossein Eshraghi had been· 
appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of 
Iran to New Zealand. The Iranian representative is based 
in Canberra and carries: dual accreditation. · The· New 
Zealand Minist·er of Finance, Mr· Rowling, .visited Iran in 
early January' 1974' and :found prospec·ts for "extremely 
useful relations, both political and trade", 53 , .. between 
New Zealand and Iran. Th~ diplo~atic·relationship was 
stre!lgthened further when, from 27 to. JO September, 1974, 
th~ Shah and Empress .of Iran made a visit to New Zealand. 
On. 30 September, 1g74~ a trade ~greement between New 
Zealand and Iran was signed. It was also_ announced at 
this time that New Zealand would establish an embassy in 
Teheran by early 1975, On 1g Deriemb~r, 1g74, it was 
announced that Mr B.M-. Brown had been appointed as New 
Zealand's first Ambassador to Ira.n. He ·is expected to 
take up his duties in March 1975, although Mr E .R. Woods, 
who has beeri appointed first secretary in the Embassy, 
will act as charge d'affaires in Teheran from early 
January, 1975. 54. 
It is fairly clear, theri, that since Dctober, 1973, 
there has been a dramatic increase in the level .of 
diplomatic activity between New Zealand and the Middle 
Eastern nations. There is no doubt that the oil crisis 
has been a major reason for this. 
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The increased interest in the Arab nations has not 
been universally welcomed howeve.r. For instance, the 
Mayor of Auckland, Sir Dove-Myer Robinson" himself a Jew, 
has publicly expressed the not uncommon view that New 
Zealand was selling .out its moral obl~gations to Israel 
for materialistic.. gains from the Arab oil-producers. 55. 
The emphasis on morality is parti.cularly relevant .when 
one considers Mr Kirk's expressed wish to "find and hold 
to a firm moral basis", 56, for New Zealand's. fore~gn 
policy. 
New Zealand's. cha~ged relationship with Israel 
since the oil crisis has also been quite significant. 
As has been noted, in spite of the close tie~ with Israel 
and the support for the Labour Party from the New Zealand 
Jewish community,. the Labour Governmei:.t turned around 
.soon after the oil crisis and sent a mission through the 
·Arab States. There is no doubt that such a move, while 
probably in New Zealand's best interests, .still 
represented a considerable cooli~g off of the New Zealand 
-Israeli relationship. Despite .the numerous recent 
visits to New Zealand by Israeli officials, most notably 
M~ M. Varon, a senior Israeli Diplomat in cha~ge of the 
Asian and Pacific Division of the Israeli Ministry of 
Fore~gn Affairs, in May, .197 4, the New Zealand Government 
has ~ej~cted .its former close ties with Israel. Further 
.evidence of the shift in New Zealand's policy is the 
· refusal of the New Zealand Government to allow Israel to 
set up an EmbassY in New Zealand, despite the fact that 
Israel got agreement to do so before the oil crisis 
erupted. 
Meanwhile, New Zealand has accredited an 
Ambassador to ~gypt and is setting up an Embassy in Ira.n. 
It is known that Israeli officials feel a sense of 
betrayal from these actions by the New Zealand 
Government. 57. 
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·Further indications of a slight shift in New 
Zealand's fore~gn policy can be :seen if one examines the 
annual reports of the Ministry of Fo:re~gn Affair>s. In 
his introduction to the repnrt for th~ year ended 31 · 
March, 1973, Prime Minister Kirk made no mention what-
soever of the Middle East or any individual country in 
the Middle East. Th~ Middle East did, how~ver, rate a 
mention in the world survey .of areas. However, _the 
par~graph on the Middle East was written· in terms .of 
0 terrorist" and 11 extreniist" Arab and Palestinian_ groups 
committi~1g "outr?Lges" against Israel. 58. After the .4th 
Arab-Israeli conflict and the oil ·crisis the New Zealand 
position cha~ged sl~ghtly. The Middle East did. feature 
in Mr Kirk's introduction in the ·report for the year 
ended 31 March, 1g74. Mr Kirk cited the Middle East as 
a new area of foreign policy for New Zealand. Mr Kirk 
said that the Middle East was an area of "enormous 
potential" and that his G.overnment "intends to see that 
New Zealand seizes this opportunity". 59. The world 
area survey also devoted considerably more attention to 
th~ Middle East than did the 1973 repor>t. In addition, 
the 1974 report made no mention of terrorist outrages but 
instead concentrated on the "efforts to secure peace",60, 
in the area and New Zealand's. efforts to expand contacts 
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in the Middle East. No longer did any attempt to 
apportion blame .to. either side exist; .further. evidence of 
a more 'even handed' approach to the Middle East situation. 
There is no doubt that the cooling .off, in public 
at ieast, .of New Zealand's relations with Israel is a 
direct result of the oil ·crisis. As a result of the oil 
crisis, New Zealand has altered its idealistic and identity 
obj.ectives and has consequently shifted its political 
sympathies to. a more neutral position in order not to 
antagonize the Arab oil-producers. T.his shift is 
particularly evident in New Zealand's. "'voti!lg in the UN 
since October, 197.3. 
Once ~the actual. f~ghti!lg had quietened down, the 
General Assembly heard several motions on the Middle East 
situation. In December, 1973, the General Assembly 
heard at least four such motions. The first motion was 
one which proposed the Palestinians' r~ght to self-
determinatio.n. New Zealand abstained on this. vote. New 
Zealand also abstained. from the General· Assembly. vote 
condemning Israel's confiscation of land and property in 
. the 'occupied territories'.. New Zealand ~gain abstained 
from voting on a resolution condemning the establishment 
.of Israeli settlements in the 'occupied ter~itorie~'. 
New Zealand did, however, vote in favou·r of a resolution 
calling for an examination of the Palestinian ref!J.gee 
problem and the question of the resettlement of the 
Palestinian refugees. 
Then, in January, 1·97~:~., the· ques.tion of s.overeignty 
of the 'occupied territories' was raised. New Zealand 
abstained from a resolution condemning Israel's 
exploitation of the natural resource~ in the 'occupied 
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territories' .. This list of abstentions on matters 
concerning the rights .of the Palestinians and those Arab 
states which have lost territory thro~gh war was in 
keepi~g with New Zealand's post-su·ez, 'low profile' in 
Middle East affairs. 61; 
However, once the· real s~gnificance of the oil 
crisis became clear New Zealand changed its position 
slightly. On 14. October, 1974, the General Assembly 
gave preliminary ~onsideration to 'The Question of 
Palestine.'. Before 'the Assembly was· a draft resolution 
sponsored by. 71 '.countries inviting the Palestinian 
Liberation O!'ganization (PLO), as the representatives of 
the Palestinian people, to participate in the 
deliberations on this question in the Plenary meetings. 
Twenty-one speakers took part in the debat.e. The 
Assembly then adopted the resolution by 105 (including 
New Zealand) votes to 4 ?-gainst (including Israel and the 
US) with 20. abstentions (including Australia, Canada, and 
the United Ki~gdom). 62. Naturally, the Israelis were 
8.!J.gered by the UN invitation to. the PLO, which the 
Israelis regard "not as a national liberation movement, 
but the organization for terrorist groups who have 
perpetrated dastardly acts of terrorism in Israel as well 
as in other dountries". 63. The. vote meant that for the 
first time representatives of other than a United Nations 
member state had been invited to take part in the 
deliberations of the plenary assembly. The United States 
Ambassador, Mr John Scali, expressed his "profound 
concern" over the resolution's departure from the long-
standing precedent that only representatives of 
governments should be ~llowed to participate in plenary 
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deliberations. 6.lf. In New Zealand, Prime Minister Rowli!lg 
defended New Zealand's vote. Mr Rowli!lg said that the 
Israelis strongly objected to New Zealand's voting in 
favour of the PLO bei!lg. gi veri observer status. 65. Mr 
Rowli!lg said that New Zealand's decision was based on 
the .overriding desirability of hearing, in the United 
Nations. debate on Palestine, the. ~iews of the only 
available representatives of the Arab peOple of 
Palestine as such. . The vote. ·did not mean, he ·said, 
that New Zealand condoned all methods used by 
o~ganizations like the PLO - specifically armed 
violence and terrorism. There is little doubt,. how.ever 
that this vote was a significant departure from New 
Zealand's .low profile policy on Middle East affairs, and 
it .certainly was a shift away froni New Zealand's pro-
Israeli sympathies. 
On 13 November, 197 4 ,. the General Assembly debate 
on Palestine was opened by Mr Yasser Arafat, leader of 
.the Palestinian Liberation O~ganization. Arafat told 
the Assembly that he had come with "an olive branch and 
a ·freedom fighter's_ gun", 66, and warne·d: "Do not let 
the olive branch fall from my hands:n. Arafat was. given 
a standing ovation by most of the del~gates. Among the 
del~gates to remain seated were those of the United 
.States, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. 67. The 
Israelis, who had boycotte.d the speech, promptly denounced 
the PLO as murderers, assassins and cut-throat.s. 6:8. 
The New Zealand Ambassador to the United Nations, 
Mr M. Templeton, made his speech in the General Assembly 
debate on Palestine on 21 November, 1974. His speech 
made it abundantly clear that New Zealand had "abandoned 
any semblance of. favouritism towards Israel in its 
international diplomatic posture". 69. Observers 
described the New Zealand speech - one of the shortest 
in the debate - as havi~g a completely " even handed 11 
approach. . New Zealand declared that Israel should. give 
up territory it conquered in 1967, and that it did not 
recognize Israel's annexation of Jerusalem. New Zealand 
did, however, reaffirm its belief that Israel had a right 
to exist as a sovereign independent State, with 
guaranteed border.s .. 7.0. On 22. N.ovember, the UN General 
Assembly adopted a resolution reaffirming the r~ghts of 
11 the Palestinian people in Palestine" to nationhood and 
to return to their homes and property. The resolution, 
jointly sponsored by. the Arab states and a number of 
other non-aligned nations, further reriognized the r~ght 
of the Palestinians "to reg·ain their r~ght·s by all means 
in accordance with the purposes· and principles of the 
charter of the United Nations". 71; A total of 89 
members. voted for the .resolutio.n. 
!=lgainst and 37 abstentions. 72. 
Ther.e were eight 
The United States was 
erriong the countries which voted ?-gainst the resolution. 
: -Britain and the other European Common Market· members 
abstained. New Zealand also abstained from voti~g on 
this resolution. 7.3. The Assembly also adopted a 
second resolution inviting the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization to the Assembly sessions as an observer. 
The vote was: 95 for, 17 ?-gainst, 19 abstentions. 7.4. 
New Zealand abstained from the. vote .. 75. 
New Zealand's vote in favour of. giving the PLO an 
invitation to take part in the General Assembly debate 
on Palestine was in contrast to New Zealand's history of 
abstaining from substantive votes on the Middle East 
situation. It seems very probable that New Zealand's 
willingness to invite the PLO to the UN was prompted by 
the increased bargaining power acquired by the Arab 
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nations since the oil crisis. New Zealand's abstention 
on the vote to give the PLO permanent observer status at 
the UN was in keeping with New Zealand's policy and, in 
an explanation of its positive vote to invite the PLO to 
address the UN, New Zealand had stressed that the first 
vote would not prejudice New Zealand's attitude towards 
~he attendance of the PLO at meetings on other occasions. 
76. Nevertheless, a slight shift in New Zealand's 
Middle East policy seems to have occurred. It would 
appear that the New Zealand Government has adopted a 
foreign policy which, while not pro-Arab, definitely 
attempts to avoid antagonizing the Arab nations. The 
main reason for such a policy shift would appear to be 
oil pressure from the Arab oil-producers. 
(IV) CONCLUSION 89 
The oil 'Crisis has provided few threats, .either 
direct or indirect, to New Zealand's security. However, 
as has been shown, New Zealand's prosperity and economic 
welfare objectives were threabened b~ the ~il crisis. 
From available figures it appears that oil supplies to 
New Zealand were reduced most markedly in January and 
February, 197:4, .but after that point the supply 
situation eased considerably and no .lo!J.ger seems to be 
a major threat. , The increased oil prices appear to have 
boosted New Zealand's inflation rate by about 2 or. 3 · 
percen.t. The price of premium_ grade petrolerun has 
risen abo'G.t .43 per.cent. since October, 1973, .and seems 
sure to increa'se again in early 197:5. 
The total effects of the increased oil price~ may 
well add abou.t $200 million to New Zealand's. import bill 
in the 1974-75 financial year. This incr~ased oil bill 
will considerably worsen New Zealand's existing balance 
of payments_ problem,s. To meet the economic threats New 
Zealand has stepped up its trade contacts and interests 
in the Middle East since the oil crisis. With the 
massive surpluses bei~,g accumulated by' the oil-producers 
the future prospects for trade in the Middle East appear 
·1 
exce llen.t. It is doubtful if this trade interest in the 
Middle East would have developed so quickly without the 
oil crisi,s o 
The oil crisis has established one important new 
fact of life: no longer can one afford to waste ·ene~'gy 
resourc~s. The oil crisis has resulted in a consider-
able increase in activity in the search for, .and 
development of', New Zealand's energy resource.s. The oil 
crisis has forced the New Zealand Government .to evo.lve a 
policy of state involvement in the search. for, and 
development of, .oil as well as providi!lg added impetus 
for further exploration in an attempt to lower New 
Zealand's dependence upon imported oil supplie:s. New 
Zealand is well endowed with ene!'gy resources and the 
oil crisis has made quite clear the need to. develop some 
of these resource:s. If the policy makers take this 
chance, the oil crisis may well prove to be a :ble·s·sing in 
disguise for the. future, planned. de.velopment and 
efficient utilization of New Zealand's. ene!'gy resources. 
The oil. ·crisis has. threatened the ·internation·a1 
-monetary system and has also threatened the stability of 
world trad.e. As has been noted, .however, .there is not 
a. great deal that New Zealand can do to influence future 
developments in this are.a. 
The use of oil as a political weapon by the· Arab 
bloc in their str:uggle against Israel has been one ·or 
the major recent developments in th~ Middle Ea~t. As 
a result of Arab pres.sure, through the· manipulation· of 
:)i1 supplies, many of the oil-consumers have bee·n forced 
to reconsider some of their idealistic and identity 
obj.ecti ve.s. New Zealand has been no exception he·r:e. 
New Zealand, more than 80 percent dependent upon 
imported Arab oil, .has, to all appearances, .altered its 
diplomatic stance towards the Middle Eas:t. · New Zealand 
with its history of pro-Israeli sympathies before ·the oil 
·crisis' has now been pushed to a more neutral ·or even-
handed positio.n. Considerations of future oi·l supplies 
may well have been one ~f th~ major reason~ for th~s 
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sl~ght shift .j_n New .Zealand's, fo~e~gn policy. This 
slight shift in foreign policy has also been reflected 
in' Ne·w Zea.land rs voting patterns in the UN since the oil 
eris i:s. 
Havi!J.g examined .how New Zealand reacted .to the 
oil. crisis it is now necessary to try to match these 
reactions ~gainst the small-state th~ori~i. The small-
state. theories s:uggest .that a small state is more 
vulnerable to pressure than a la!'ger state. in times of 
crisis. Accordingly, .New Zealand's policies shou~ld have 
been influenced as a result of the Arab oil-pressure 
during the ~il crisi:s. In theory, then·, ,New Zealand's 
fore~gn policy should have changed from its pro-Israeli 
stance to a more pro-Arab stanc.e. 
In practice, the situation was not quite so 
stra~ghtforward. In. fact, the Arab oil-produce~s appear 
.to have applied little, or no, direct pressure upon New 
Zealand to cha!J.ge its foreign policy. There is very 
little evidetice that the Arab oil-producers were even 
interested in New Zealand's polici~s. New Zealand was, 
however, subjected to. the_ general reduction in oil supplies 
and this was the ma1n. form of direct pressure felt by New 
·.Zealand duri!J.g the oil crisi:s. As a result of this 
pressure, ,the· New Zealand Government appears to have 
altered its fore1gn policy, from a pro-Israeli stance to 
a more neutral positio.n. Obviously, a small state such 
as New· Zealand would not want to ant?-gonize the Arab oil-
producers any more than was absolutely necessary. 
Therefore, ~f a favourable reception by the Arabs 
required a slight foreign policy shift theti this would 
be the most obvious course to follow, for a small state 
with very little bargaining pow~r. The New Zealand 
Government decided that such a small. for~ign policy 
shift was required in order to try to cushion the 
effects of the Arab oil-pressu~e. Overall, then, New 
Zealand would appear to have reacted in the' manner 
suggested by the small-state theorists. 
1) See Kennaway, op.cit., pp. 144-145. 
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CHAPTER 4 
WORLDWIDE REACTIONS TO THE OIL 'CRISIS . 
That New Zealand reacted in .very much the way one 
would. expect from the traditional small-state model. does 
not, in itself, prove the model to be correct. To. be 
valid the model should also be able to account for the 
.reactions of other small (and,. by implication·, large) 
states to the same set of variable.s. In ·order to test · 
the small-state model I have ·made a survey .of the 
reactions of some twenty-five other states to the ·oil 
crisis . The survey,. while rather superficial; will 
. still pr.ovide a useful basis for testing the ·small-state. · 
mode_l. · 
I will attempt .to establish each state.' s. position 
vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict bo.th before and after 
the 1973 outbreak. A comparison will then be made of 
the individual foreign policies and I will attempt to 
draw some conclusions about the apparent validity. of the 
small-state mod~l. 
The. first basis for classificatiori was the 
di vision into small and large state:s. My survey includes 
. thirteen la!'ge states and thirteen small states. I have 
also classified each country as either developed or 
underdeveloped (see Table. lZ.a). While these classific-
ations maybe disputed they are based on my own 
interpretation of the definition of a small state used 
throughout this study (see pp. 1~2) .. 1.· 
. Havi!1g classified each country in this manner it is 
now necessary to establish each country's. foreign policy 
towards the Middle East before the 1973 con£lict and the 
Ta!2~e 12 (a) 
Size classification of states 
Small, developed 
Australia 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
South Africa 
Spain 
Rhodesia 
La!'ge, developed 
Japan 
United Kingdom 
West Germany 
Italy 
USA 
Canada 
USSR 
France 
ensuing oil crisis. 
Small, underdeveloped 
Kenya 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
·La!ge, underdeveloped 
Brazil 
.China 
India 
Pakistan 
Turkey 
Based on a combinati.on of voti~g 
duri~g the 1967 Fifth Emergency Special Session of the 
UN General Assembly, 2, and the actual classifications 
applied to certain countries by the Arab oil-producers, 
I have arbitrarily classified the .twenty-six countries 
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into .four main categories: pro-Israel;· pro-'Arab, neutral 
and positive neutral (i .. e. those neutral countries 
actively engaged in the pursuit of a Middle East 
settlement) . Based on a wide readi~g of eventa since 
the oil crisis erupted, as well as UN. voting behaviour 
- the most s~gnificant vote. being the General Assembly 
decision to invite the PLO to address the UN, 3, - and, 
where possible, .the actual Arab classifications, 4, I 
have also classified each country's. fore~gn policy 
towards the Middle East after the oil ·crisis (See Table · 
13). 
Having classified each country in this manner I 
have tried to test the small..:state. theory against .the 
actual reactions. In rnQ"d~y..r.to do this I have introduced 
1rable 13 
Comparative Foreign Policy Positions (1967 and 1974) 
1974 
Large, developed, changed foreign policy 
Japan 
United Kingdom 
West Germany 
Italy 
pro-Israel 
pro-Israel 
pro-Israel 
pro-Israel 
pro-'Arab 
pos. neutral/pro-'Arab 
pos. neutral/pro-Arab 
pos. neutral/pro-Arab 
Large, developed, unchanged foreign policy 
.U.S.A. 
Canada 
.. U. S •. S. R. 
France 
pro-Israel 
pro-Israel 
·pro-Arab 
neutral/pro-Arab 
La?'.'ge, underdeveloped, changed foreign policy 
Brazil 
China 
pro-Israel 
neutral 
pro-Arab 
pro-Arab 
Large, underdeveloped, uncha~ged foreign policy 
India 
Turkey 
Pakistan 
pro-Arab 
pro-Arab 
pro-Arab 
Small, developed, ch~ged fore~gn policy 
Belgium 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Denmark 
pro-Israel 
pro-Israel 
pro-Israel 
pro-Israel 
pos·. neU:tral/pro-'Arab 
po.s. neutral 
neutral 
neutral/pro-Israel 
Small, developed, uncha~ged foreign policy 
1'~3therlands 
South Africa · 
Rhodesia 
Spain 
pro-Israel 
pro-Israel 
pro-Israel 
pro-Arab 
Small, underdeveloped, .cha~ged foreign pol'icy 
Kenya 
Philippines 
po.s. neutral 
pro-Israel 
pro-' Arab 
pro-'Arab 
Small, underdeveloped, uncha~ged fore~gn pol'icy 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Port~gal 
,pro-'Arab 
pro-Arab 
pro-Israel 
four extra variab le.s. These four. variables are '(I). 
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oil's. share of primary ene?'.'gY, {2.}. the level ·.of imported 
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oil, (3) the level of imported oil from the OAPEG .countrie.s, 
and ( ll) the presence of pressure to cha!lge a foreign 
policy. 
The. first variable is oil 1 s share of the primary 
energy market in each individual country. For the 
purpose of this study I have used figures ~rom three 
major sources. One source was the OECD Economic Outlook, 
no".14., of December, 1973. Another major source used was 
the 1973 BP Statistical Rewiew of the World Oil Industry. 
The third major source used was the World Map of the 
Ene?'.'gy Market, which was published in the May, 1974 
issue of the Geographical Magazine. Where accurate 
f~gures were .available I have used 60 percent as the 
dividi!lg line between a high proportion of the primary 
ene?'.'gy market and a lo~ proportion of the primary ene?'.'gy 
marke.t. In only two cases, .Tanzania and Zambia, was it 
necessary to make an informed estimate at oil's. share of 
the primary energy marke.t. The classifications arrived 
at are included in Table 14 .. 
I have also classified each country in terms of 
its. level of imported oil. Using the three previous 
sources plus Toward a National Materials Policy - World 
Perspective, 5, I have classified each ·state which 
imported more than 60 percent of its crude oil re.quirements 
as a high level oil-importer, and those under 60 percent 
have been classified as low-level importers (See Table 14.). 
In addition, .I have classified each state in terms 
of the level of OAPEC oil it .imports .. An additional 
source used h~re was the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies' Strategic Survey, .1973 .· · For this 
cat~gory I have classified a 50 percent o~ h~gher 
dependence upon OAPEC oil as bei!lg a high level .of 
dependence (see Table lll)o 
Table 14 
OIL'S ROLE IN THE VARIOUS ENERGY ECONOMIES 
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Country Oil as % 
.of primary 
energy 
% oil 
imported 
% imported 
oil. ·from 
OAPEC states 
Japan 
• United Kingdom 
West Germany 
Italy 
USA 
Canada 
USSR 
· France 
. Brazil 
China 
India 
Turkey 
Pakistan 
. Belgium 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
South Africa 
Rhodesia 
Spain 
Kenya 
Phi-lippines 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Port~gal 
h~gh-8.0. 0 
low- 52.0 
low- 5:8. 5 
high-7;806 
low- 4_7-.1 
low- 5:1;6 
low- -33.5 
high-}l.-.0 
high=8.4. 0 
low- :0. 9 
low- 2:6.o 
high-6.6 .o 
low- 52 •. o 
high...:6:3 .7 
low- 4:9. 9 
high-62.0 
high-8.8 0 8 
low- 5:4.2 
low- 1:9. 5 · 
low- 1:4.8 
high~7:0. 0 
high-9,0 0 0 
high-9_9·. 0 
high- :n .:a. 
high- .n.·:a• 
h~gh-8.3. 3 
high~ 9.9. 5 
high-100 
high- 9:3.0 
high- 9.8·. 8 
low- 1:6 .• 1 
low- 40.4 
(Iran) 
high-7.3. 8 
high-7:1 .• 3 
high-7:7.9 
low- .. 1_9 .• 1 ·-. 
(Canada, Caribbean) 
low- · :0. O low- · :0. 0 
(rie~ exporter of oil) 
lo~ low 
(self-sufficient, but 
imports. Arab oil for 
political reasons) 
high- 9:7. 7. high-7.4 .• 1 .. 
high- 68.2 low- :n.:a. 
· (Caribbean) 
low lo~ 
(self-sufficient). 
high- 68.5 low- 2:2;o 
· (Iran) 
high~ 62~0 high~ n.~~ 
high- 99.0 high~ n.~. 
h~ 100 h1~gh~6_9.2. igh- · ... 
low- 3_0.0 high-7.o.o 
high~ 99.9 high-82.8 
high~lOQ high-56-.6 
high- 97.0 High-7:2.4 
high~lOO high- :n..:a •. 
high-100 . high- :n.:a. 
high- 99.1 · high--n~~· 
high-100 low-.n •. a. (Iran) 
high-100 high- n-.:a. 
high- :n.:a. high- :n .:a. 
high- :n .·a. high- :n .• :_a. 
high-100 low- :n.:a. 
· (Iran, A!lgola) 
F~gures are pr.edominantly for 1971 .and 1972 
:N .:a.= figures not availab l:e. 
SOURCES: OECD Economic Outlook, December, 1973 · 
BP Statistical Review of the World Oil 
Industry_,_l2]J_. 
Geographical Magazine, May, 1974 
Toward a National Materials Policy, 
January, .1973 
Str~te_gic Survey, 1973 · 
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In order to calculate the effect of the oil weapon 
it was necessary to establish which .of the states under 
survey were in. fact subj.ected to Arab oil-pressur.e. In 
this context 'oil-pressure' was defined as a threatened 
or actual cutb.ack in supplies· by the Arab oil-producer.s. 
I have. grouped thOse countries which were specifically 
not subjected to Arab oil-pressure and have treated the 
remaining countries as being subj.ected to oi:l-'pressur.e. 
Of the twenty-six countries, eleven were not subjected 
to the Arab oil-pressure (see Table 15;) o Canada, being 
Table 15 
THE PRESENCE OF ARAB OIL-PRESSURE 
Japan Pressure 
United Kingdom Pressure 
West Germany Pressure 
Italy Pressure 
USA Pressure 
Canada No Pressure 
USSR No Pressure 
France No Pressure 
Brazil Pressure 
China No Pressure 
India No Pressure 
Turkey No ··Pressure 
Pakistan No Pressure 
Belgium Pressure 
Australia Pressure 
New Zealand ·Pressure 
Denmark Pressure 
Netherlands Pressure 
South Africa Pressure 
Rhodesia Pressure 
Spain No · Pressure 
Kenya No · Pressure 
Philippines Pressure 
Tanzania No Pressure 
: Zambia No Pressure 
Port~gal Pressure 
totally self-sufficient in oil; was not subjec.te.d to the 
Arab oil-pressure. China was e~empted fro~ the press-
ure. for much the same reaso.n. The USSR, as the Arab 
bloc's superpower ally, was not subjected to Arab oil-
Prance, which had developed strong friendship 
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ties with the. Arab nations under De Gaulle's. Presidency, 
was also exempted from any real oil-pressur.e. India, 
Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia had all been supporters of 
the. Arab nations before the oil crisis and were exempted 
from the oil-pressur;e. Spain, which has never 
recognized the State of Israel, was also not subjected 
to Arab oil-pressur;e. Turkey and Pakistan, because of 
their Islamic 'brother' relationships with the Arab bloc 
escaped the Arab oil-pres.sur.e. 
Having established the variables involved I have 
then tried to find any correlation which may exis.t. 
The most obvious correlation suggested by the small-state 
theory is that there is a direct relationship between 
small size and vulnerability to :pressure (see Table 16) • 
. Of the la?'.'ge states surveyed about .46 percent ( 6/13) had 
a different Middle Eastern fore~gn policy iri 1g74 
compared with 196:7. However, one ·country, _China, is 
self-sufficient in crude oil production, .and its policy 
change was the result of a political and idedl~gical 
decision rather than Arab oil-pressur.e. :6. Severi of the 
J ::t?'.'ge states surveyed had retained their· 1967 stance 
after the oil cris~s. How.ever, .of the seven large 
states only the. USA was actually subj.ecte,cf to Arab oil-
pressure. This means that of the la?'.'ge states 
surveyed six were subjected to the Arab oi1-pressur:e. 
Of the six, five countries changed their Middle Eastern 
foreign polici~s. This represents an 8 3 percent cha~ge 
in. foreign policies of la?'.'ge states when subJected to 
pressur.e. :7. Of the small states studied 46 percent had 
differing Middle Eastern policies in· 19E7 and 1974. Of 
these, only one, Kenya, could be said to. have ~scaped 
Table 16. 
CORRELATION OF SIZE, POLICY CHANGE, AND OIL-PRESSURE 
SIZE 
Large 
(n;,,,13) 
Small 
(ri=lJ) 
FOREIGN POLICY OIL-PRESSURE 
6 changed-Japan . Yes 
· -United Kingdom Ye·s 
-West Germany Ye·s 
-Italy Y~s 
-Brazil Ye·s· 
-China No 
. T Unchanged-USA Yes· 
· -Canada N6 
-USSR No 
-France No 
-India No 
-Turkey No · 
-Pakistan No 
6 changed-Belgium 
· -Australia 
-New Zealand 
-Denmark 
-Kenya 
-Phil;ippines 
. Yes·· 
Ye·s 
. Ye·s · 
. Yes:· 
No' 
. Yes· 
: 7 uncha!J-ged-Netherlands Yes 
-South Africa Y~s 
-Rhodesia Ye.s. 
-Portugal Ye·s 
-Tanz~nia N6 
-Zambia No 
-Spain No · 
the Arab oil-pressu~e. This was la?'."gely because of 
Kenya's close a£filiation with the African bloc of 
states which had. given their ideological support to the 
Arab bloc before the oil cris~s. Of the ~seven small 
states which had uncha!J-ged Middle Eastern policies in 
1967 and 1974 three - Tanzania, Zambia, .and Spain - were 
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not subjected to Arab oil- pressur.e. This means that of 
the small states surveyed, nine were sU:bj.ected to Arab 
oil-pressur,e. Of the nine;. five (55%) cha!J-ged their 
Middle Eastern fore~gn policies, and four (45%) resisted 
the pressure to ch~ge. 
From these. f~gures, .then, .it appears that .there 
was no strong correlation betw.een the size of a country 
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and its. vulnerability. to the Arab oil-pressu~e. In. fact 
whereas five of the six (83%) large countries suhj.ected 
to the Arab oil-pressure changed their foreign policies 
only five of the nine .(55%) small states subjected .to 
the Arab oil-pressure cha!lged their. fore~gn policies. 
This is rather contrary to what one would expect from 
the small state model, :which s:uggests that small states 
.have a lower resistance level to pressure than la!'ger 
.state.s. 
As the expected stro!lg correlation between size and 
vulnerability was not present during the ·oil crisis theri 
it is possible that some alt·ernative ·correlation may have 
existe:d• Another possible correlation is bet:weeri the 
proportion of oil as a primary ene!'gy source :(h~gh or 
low), .and vulnerability to pressur.e. In. fou·rteen of the 
twenty-six nations surveyed oil provided a high · ( . 
proportion of the primary ene!'gy requirerrient:s. · Of those 
fourteen countries, e~ght .( 57·%) had changed their fore~gn 
policies towards the Middle East after 1967 ( S.ee Table 17:). 
Of the twelve countries where oil provides· a low proportion 
of' the primary ene!'gy requirements, only four (33%) 
recorded ch~ges in thei"r Middle Eastern poii·cies after 
196:7. 
Table 17 
CORRELATION OF OIL'S SHARE OF PRIMARY ENERGY REQUIREMENTS, 
POLICY 9J:IANGE, AND OIL PRESSURE 
Oil's share of primary ene!"·gy Policy 
High "( +6 0%) · 8 cha;!lged 
6. unchanged 
Oil-pressure 
7 pressured; 
1 ·.unpressured 
1 pressured; 
5 unpressured 
con.t .. 
Tab le 17( cont· .. ) 
Low ( ...:60%) 
(ri=l2) 
Policy 
4 cha:~ged 
· 8 unchanged 
oil-pressure 
. 3 pressured; 
1 unpressured 
4 pressured; 
4 unpressured 
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Of the eight states where oil provide~ a high proportion 
of the primary energy requirements and which were 
subjected to oil-pressure, seven (87%) had cha~ged their 
1967 Middle Eastern policies by 1974 .. · On the other 
hand, of the seven: countries where ·oil provides a low 
proportion of the primary ene!'gy requirerrien·ts, only 
three ( 43%) had altered their 19.67 Middle Easte·rn 
policies. 
From these f;Lgures, it appears that there may 
well be a positive, direct corre.lation between a h;i_gh · 
oil share of primary energy requirements and vulnerabil-
ity to oil-pressure. 
An examination of the ·1evel of· oil imported and 
the. vulnerability. to change ·when subjected to pressure 
also shows an interesting correlation (see Table 18,). 
Table 18. 
CORRELATION OF THE LEVEL OF IMPORTED OIL, POLICY CHANGE, 
AND OIL PRESSURE 
Level, of oil imported Policy 
High '( +60%) 
(ri=2l) 
Low ( :..:60%) 
(ri=5) 
10 .. changed 
.· .11 uncha~ged 
. 3 cha~ged 
2 '.unchanged 
Oil...:pressure 
9 pressured; 
1 ·unpressured 
4 pressured; 
: 7 unpressured 
· .. · .1 ·pressured; 
2 ·unpressured 
· 1 ·pressured; 
1 ·unpressured 
Of those states with a h;Lgh dependence upon imported 
oil supplies (ri=21), about 50 percent changed their 
lOU 
Middle Eastern policies between 1967 and 1974. However, 
eight of the countries with a high dependence of imported 
oil were not subjected to oil-pressure. Of the 
remaining thirteen countries which were subj.ected to 
pressure, nine (69%) did in fact change their Middle 
Eastern policies. This is a significant, positive 
correlation. figure, despite the fact that the survey has 
not included a sufficient number of countries with a low 
dependence upon imported oil supplies. The figures 
appear to suggest that the higher the ·country's 
dependence upon imported oil, the. greater the likelihood 
of a policy change when subjected to oil-pressure. 
The oil crisis was, however, mainly an Arab oil 
crisis. It is interesting to no~e, then, the 
correlation between levels of imported OAPEC oil supplies 
and Arab oil-pressure (see Table 19J. Of the eleven 
countries which had a h~gh level of dependence upon 
OAPEC oil and were subjected to the Arab oil-pressure, 
eight ( 7-3%) eountries. changed their Middle Eastern 
policies. This is an .even higher correlation than the 
69 percent of countries with a h~gh level of imported 
oil which changed their Middle Eastern polici~s. Once 
-
again, because of the low number of countries surveyed 
with a low l.evel of dependence upon OAPEC oil and which 
were subjected to the Arab oil-pressure (4.). the f~gure 
of a 50 percent change of foreign policies is rather 
inflated and less significan.t. 
Nevertheless, fro~ the~e statistics it appe~rs 
as though, while no positive, direct correlation between 
size and vulnerability to oil-pressure existed during 
the oil crisis, some other significant correlations did 
. .l.U SJ 
Table 19 
CORRELATION OF THE LEVEL OF IMPORTED OAPEC OIL SUPPLIES, 
POLICY CHANGE, AND OIL-PRESSURE 
Level of OAPEC oil imported Policy Oil-pressure 
High (+50%) '8 cha!lged · 8 pressured; 
(n~17) 0 unpressured 
9 unchanged 3 pressured; 
6 unpressured 
Low (..:50%) · 4 .cha!lged 2 pressured; 
(ri=9) 2 .unpressured 
5 unchanged 2 pressured; 
3 unpressured 
exist. For instance, this survey suggests that there 
may well have been a s~gnificant, positive cor~elation 
between a high oil share of primary energy requirements · 
and vulnerability to oil-pressure. This survey also 
s~ggests that while there was a positive, correlation 
between a high level of oil imports and vulnerability 
to oil-pressure, there may well have been an even more 
s~gnificant, positive correlation between a high level 
.of imported OAPEC oil and vulnerability. to Arab oil-
pressure. 
From this survey, then, it appears that, while 
varyi!l-g d~grees of policy shifts have ·occurred as a 
·result of the oil crisis, the policy shifts have not 
followed a small state/large state patter.n. Indeed 
the Arab oil-producers never intended forci!lg mainly 
the small states to alter their foreign policies .. towards 
the Middle East. In. fact, the oil weapon was aimed 
more specifically at the la~ger, more influential states. 
Th~ use of oil as a weapon required a consciotis 
decision from the OAPEC countries to form a coalitio.n. 
Given the heterogeneous nature of th~ Arab states, such 
a coalition could only occur if it was the result of 
some. great social. force. 'rhat social force was. the 
outbreak, in October, 1973, of the 4th Arab-Israeli War. 
This is the Arab v. Israel part of the strat~gic 
interaction model (Figure 1). In an endeavour to 
bring pressure to bear upon Israel a policy of oil 
production cutbacks and, in some cases, a total boycott., 
was decided upon by the Arab bloc. This led to the 
Arab oil-producers classifying the rest of the world· 
into 'friends', 'neutrals', and 'enemies.'. This 
classification can be further refined if one divides 
the neutrals and the positive neutrals (1e. those 
actively engaged in the pursuit of a Middle East settle-
ment). Oil supplies were regulated according to 
classification, with (in theory at least) the frieridly 
nations receiving minimal inconvenience and enemies 
suffering a total boycott. The Arab bloc hoped that 
in this wa"'j' they would be able to squeeze favourable 
concessions out of previously unfavourable situations. 
This would be reflected by an upward sh~ft in th~ scale 
of .'friendliness' towards the Arab states, as outlined 
in part (a) of the strategic interaction mode.I. 
The oil weapon was intended to have a two-tiered 
effect: direct and indirect (cir filtered). The 
direct effect is illustrated in di?-gram (b) of the 
strat~gic interaction mode.I. The Arab. bloc hoped that 
by applying pressure on the oil consumers - especi_ally 
the US, the principal_ guarantor of Israel's existence -
that direct pressure would, in turn, be brought to bear 
on Israel. By denyi!lg the US the supplies of oil 
which it needed to meet its growing demand it was hoped 
that the average US citizen, den~ed some ~f the ·comforts 
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Figure 1: . Strategic Interaction Model for the Oil Crisis 
(a) Friendship effect (--·..;) upon application of pressure(~) 
FRIENDS USSR, 
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India, 
France, 
I 
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I 
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NEUTRALS 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
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Japan 
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I I China 
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· United Kingdom 
West .Germany 
I 
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NEUTRALS I 
Denmark 
New 1 Zealand 
I 
r~ ~~----'--------'---~~------'-~ ENEMIES Canada, Portugal, South Africa, Rhodesia, ,__------~---N.etherlands, US.A. · 
!igure 1 :. Strategic Interaction Model for the Oil Crisis 
(h) Direct effect upon application of pressure (~) 
Positive Neutrals 
bloc 
'--------=----~~~Neutrals (including New Zealand) 
that only oi.l can supply, .would urge his government to 
work. genuinely for peace in the Middle East and .thereby 
ensure the future flow of Arab oil to the US marke.t. 
Similarly> by denying the other oil-consumers the many 
comforts derived from oil the Arab bloc hOped that the 
oil-consluners would apply pressure on Israel. for a 
settlement. It was intended, then, that not only would 
the oil-consumers. become more 'friendly' with the Arab 
oil-producers, but they wotild also pressure Israel into 
a lasti!J-g settlement. It is true that many of the oil-
consuming nations have become more 'friendly' towards 
the Arab bloc since the oil ·crisi:s. However, with 
perhaps the exception of the US, there has not been 
much effective pressure for a settlement put on Israel. 
In fact, .the direct pressure from the application of the 
oil weapon is more theoretical than real. The truth of 
the situation is that only the. US has any real ability 
to pressurize Israel's. behaviour. For th~ other oil-
consumers "assorted declarations of support for the 
restoration of Arab lands (which some found humiliating, 
tho:ugh .they were largely rep.etitions of UN resolutions 
to which these governments were already committed), 
plus promises of trade and technical assistance, were 
the only responses they could off~r. Thei had no 
.responsibility for the American comini tment .. to Israe·1; 
nor indeed any power to influence it".· :8. This may 
not be an entirely comfo::.--table reality for all directly 
concernffd; it is probably quite humiliati!J-g for some of 
the Arab oil Minister.s. But it is, nevertheless, a 
realit,y. This miscalculation of actual effects is one 
major reaso_n why the oil weapon, .in terms of a pressure 
induced settlement, has not b~eri very successful. 
While the .overall level of success of the oil weapon 
is open to debate, I think it is fair to say that it 
did at least lubricate the way for more meani!J-gful 
discussions on the Middle East situation. 
As di~gram (c) of the strategic interaction model 
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Figure 1: Strategic Interaction Model for the Oil Crisis 
__,,.__.__._____ . ' 
(c) Filtered effect upon application of pres.sure (~) 
Friends 
Neutrals (N.:Z'.) 
Enemies 
"'+--+----
illustrates, the oil weapon was also intended to have 
a filtered effect. The oil weapon was an attempt to 
spread the effects of the conflict as widely as 
possible in order to provide the countries importing 
Arab oil with a stake in the future .stability. of the 
Middle East, .and to persuade them to saf~guard their 
stake by applying maximum pressure on the country which 
holds the key to any solution of the problem, namely 
the United State.s. By denying· Japan, Europ·e, and other 
countries. varying proport.:.ons of their requirements of 
Arab oil it was hoped that the. governments. of those 
states would, as a matter of self-interest, bri~g 
maximum pressure to bear on the. US to stabilize the 
Middle East. situatio.n. It should be not~d h~re that 
the Arab oil weapon was specifically aimed at th~ larger 
more influential stat~s. The oil emba!'go on Hol1and,a 
small state, was imposed because Holland openly. co-
operated with the US during the 4th Arab-Israeli War, 
rather than because Holland was a small stat:e •· By 
highlighting the worJ.dwide dependence upon Middle Eastern 
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oil, the Arab bloc hoped to gain the upper hand in the 
bargaining. game and, therefore, apply indirect pressure 
on Israel, through the US, for a settlemen.t. 
There is no doubt that the Arab oil-producers 
have gained the upper hand in the oil ba~gaining. game. 
However, once again the Arab oil Ministers appear to have 
.overestimated the strength of their weapo.no For a time 
.very considerable economic and political pressure was-
bei!lg exerted on what appeared to be a structure of 
lever?.ge that m~ght have been expected to achi.eve quick 
result:s o It did no:t. The levers did not appear to be 
. connected ~P. As has beeri pointed out, only. the US has 
any real leverage on Israel, .and .eyen .AJ11erican pressure 
is not. guaranteed to alter Israel's. policie.s. The 
Arabs, initially at .least, failed to .realize that 
I pressure on Euro:i:e: s and Japan's oil supplies would not 
exert some indirect pres.sure on the US. · The Arabs 
failed to realize that .the. US does not necessarily 
behave in the manner desired by, or called. for by its 
allie.s. In reality, .the Arab pressure, .if anythi!lg, 
tended to separate the US from its European allie,s. :9. 
"Faced with the major 'supply shock.' of the October 197 3 
oil embargo and the overall cutback in Arab oil production 
the immediate reaction of practically every importing 
country was _to e!lgage in a competitive scramble. for oil 
supplies, coupled with offeis to adapt its Middle East 
policy to Al"ab demands, and promises .of all kinds of 
financial inducements:".·. 1.0. In fact, .the 'America~ 
Secpetary of State, .Dr Kissi!lger, has had immense 
problems tryi!lg to. get the Western oil-consumeis t~gether 
let alone. feel any significant amount of pressure from 
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them. Even ~f such pres.sure could be exerted on 
Israel, there is no_ guarantee.that Israel would readily 
submit to the American pressur.e. The United States, de-
ployi~g all.Dr Kissinger's formidable powers of 
persuasion as well as the influence of Israel's only 
real friend and indispensable military supplier, .took 
months to achieve disengagement, even in Sina.i. 
There is little doubt that the oil weapon has had 
the desired 'friendship effect'. However, .the upward 
movement in the scale of 'friendliness' may be less 
s~gnificant than. first appearances might indicat:e. A 
pressure induced 1 friend' may well prove to .be less 
reliable in times of crisis than a 'natural frien¢'. 
The effectiveness of the intended direct pressure on 
Israel as a result of the· oil crisis has been somewhat 
less than the Arab bloc anticipate.a. In. fact,. only 
the US has any real leverage on Israeli behavio~r. · It 
is clear that the US has been aroused by the da~ger of 
the situation to press much more actively for 
n~got~ations between the Arab ~tate~ and Isra~l. It 
would also seem that the US has put more pressure on 
Israel than in the pas:t. However, even 'Miracle Man' 
Kissinger has not been able to achieve much success in 
terms of a lasting settlement. The Arab oil-producers 
also appear to have overestimated the 'indirect 1. effects 
of the oil weapon. While it is true that the. US has the 
necessary lever~ge on Israel it doe~ not· necessarily 
: follow that pressure on ·the US will result in pressure 
being applied to Isra~l. The US doe~ not· always accept 
the advice of .its allies, and even if it did, lsrael is 
hardly the sort of docile state which would .readily 
accept the American pressur.e. 
Nevertheless, it would be unfair to claim that 
the oil weapon was a total failu~e. The Arab oil-
pressure has tended to isolate Israel diplomatically. 
The oil-pressure has also been responsible .for the 
initiation of some negotiations for a settlemen.t. One 
observer even noted that "for the first time in many 
yea.rs it is no longer. foolish to hOpe, if not for a 
definitive settlement, .at least. for somethi!J.g more 
durable than a ceasefire. And it seems doubtful 
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whether anything less than the ·double shock of a war and 
an oil crisis would have sufficed to produce ·such a 
result.".· 11. But the negotiations have been, inevitablyJ 
very .complex and slow, and unless some further settle-
ment is reached befor~ the end of May, wheri the current 
.term of the UN Observer force on the Syrian-Israeli 
front expires, then the Middle East conflict may well 
erupt ?-gain. A side effect of the n~gotiations which 
have taken place has been the wider recognition of the 
Palestinian refugee 'problem' and the unprecedented 
opportunity_ given the PLn to address the UN General 
Assembl;y. The ·ail crisis, or more ·specifically. the oil 
price rises, has also beeri very beneficial, economically 
for the oil-producers. It is estimated that .the oil-
produci!J.g c_ovntries have accrued surplus revenues of 
about US$60 billion in 197 4 alon.e •· 1:2. · · · However, .the 
pre~erice of such h~gh surpluse~ has led to ~s many 
problems as benefits. 13. 
Overall, then, _the Arab oil embargo ha:s hurt those 
it intended to hurt, _but not as much ·as had pres·umably 
been hoped. It is. very significant that none of the 
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.states. under. full embar•go has a heavy import dependence 
· in energy. 1:4. Countries such as Japan and most of 
Europe have a higher dependence on imported oil and it 
was these countries whom the Arab restrictions hurt mos.t. 
The other. heavy sufferers have been the: .countries .of the 
underdeveloped world, many of whom claim a political 
'friendship' with the Arab.s. These underdeveloped 
nations face enormous. balance of payments problems a? a 
result of the increased oil price~ since Dctobei, ig73. 
15. In sum, then, .the oil weapon, while not achie"ving 
its main political aim - Israeli withdrawal from the 
-Occupied territories - has had side effects which both 
benefit the Arab states (increased revenues) and also 
hurt many of the Arab's friends - the underdeveloped 
countries = as well as threateni!lg the laboriously 
built structure of the world economy. 
· 1 )' In borderline cases I have found a di vision .of 
30 million population, .and $1, 000 GNP use:fu,l. The 
selection of an equal num.ber .of small and la!'ge, developed 
and underdeveloped states was purely arbitrary and was 
· made so.lely to ensure a wide spectrum .of countries sur-
.. ve.y.e:d. 
· 2) See the United Nations Monthly Chronicle,. vo.l. 4, 
n,o.7, July, 1967, p:p.32.-7:9 • 
. 3) Month in the United Nations, October, 1974 
mimeograph, UN Association. 
4) See Itayim, op.cit., :p.9:2• 
5) Toward a National Material Policy - World 
Perspective, Second Interim Report, January 1973, 
(Washington, National Corr.mission on Materials Policy, 1973. 
6) Se~~.~oide, .'China's Crude Oil Production', in 
Pacific Community, April, 1974, pp.462..;.470, and :L. 
Goodstadt, 'Oil provides China's solution', in Far 
Eastern Economic Revie~, 13 December, 1974. 
: 7) Although percentages have been used throughout 
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this survey, it must be ~emembered that percentages can 
tend to overinflate a trend, especially when only a 
small number of elements are in the surveyed se:t• 
.Therefore, .the percentage figures are. general indicators 
only, .and this is especially so in this survey" where the 
ma!'gin for error is quite considerable. 
· 8) J ·.E •. Hartshorn, ! A Diplom2.tic Price for· Oil?', Jn 
Pacific Community, April, 197 4, :p. 37:0. 
9) See :W .:J. Levy, . 'World Oil ·co-operation ·or 
International Chaos', .in Foreign Affairs, July,· 1974, 
pp.690-713, .and :L. Turner, 'The· European Community.: 
Factors of Disint~gration· 1 ,. in International Affairs( UK), 
July, 1974, pp.404-41:5. · 
10) Levy, op.cit., :p.696. 
11) :C. Issawi' I Checki!lg on the· ·consequences· or· the 
oil squeeze by A:rab st.atec: r, .in Inter.national Perspect-
ives, March/ April, 197 4, :p .1:1.· 
12) .Levy, op. ci:t., · :P. 691; 
13) See ·.R. Mabro and .E. Monroe; .'Arab :wealth :from· 
oll: problem~ of .its investment', .in International 
!\ffairs (UK), January, 1974, pp.15-27, .and ·F.A. Saleh," 
1
.Putting oil revenues in their proper con.text', .in 
Euromoney, October, .197 4, pp. 79-8:9. 
14) See Hartshorn, opocit, :p .• 36.9. 
15) See R. Krymm, .'The Economic Impact of Oil Prices' 
in The World Today, July, .197 4, pp. 294-305. · 
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CONCLUSIONS 
There are s.everal interesti~g points which have 
arisen. from this study. The. first major point was that 
New Zealand, in the oil cri.sis situation, appeared to act 
in a manner. very much in keeping with what the small-state 
theories would sugge~t. The small-state theories place 
a heavy emphasis on the. fact that small states are less 
able to resist pres.sure than larger; .state.so The 'theories 
maintain that, when subjected to pressure to. change 
policies, small states cha!-'"1ge more quickly. th2.n do the 
larger state.s. Trans lated into the :terms .of the·. Arab oil 
cri.sis, this means that .when subjected to Arab oil-pressure 
a small state, .such as New Zealand, should more readily 
adapt its policies to become ·mor·e in line vdth the 
policie~ desired by the pressure applicators, ~hich in 
this .study were the Arab blo:c. 
My research has establishe·d that New Zealand was 
not one of the prime ta!'gets of· the· 'Arab blo,c. As a 
result New Zealand did not appear in any serious da~ger 
of bef!lg subjected to a total oil eniba!'go. However·, .New 
Zealand was subjected to a s~gnificant reduction in 
supplies (about 10. percent) and was also· subjected to. the 
increased prices. demanded for crude oi:1. Consequer.:tly, 
New Zealand did suffer an oil crisi.s. · My rese-arch has , 
shOwn that New Zealand's .. ·crisis was initially one of oil 
supplies, and later one of increased oil prices. ' About 
· 60 percent of New Zealand 1 s. primary energy requirem~ents 
are derived from petroleum and New Zealand has a h~gh 
dependence (82 percent) on oil imported from OAPEC 
countrie.s. It was in these circumstances· that New Zealand 
was .subjected to the Arab oil-pres·sur:e. · 
In this context it became clear that the· New 
Zealand Government had to take some steps in an e.ffort to 
safeguard New Zealand's oil supplie.s. In this study I 
have examined in some deta,il the variety of measures 
take.no From this it appears that the New Zealand 
12.0. 
Government, in an endeavour to ensure the continued:. future 
supplies of oil has slightly altered New Zealand's fore~gn 
policy. My research indicates that New Zealand has 
altered its traditional pro-Israeli stance to. a more 
neutral position on Middle Easterti matte~s. I think it 
is fair to say that the Arab oil-pres.sure ha·s be.en 
responsible for at least some of this foreign policy cha!lge. 
rr·he second major finding of this .study. came ·out of 
the reactions of some twenty-five other states to the oil 
crisis. This part of my research indicated th~t no ~ery 
stro~g size/vulnerability to pressure correlation existed 
duri.~g the oil crisis. In fact my survey suggested that 
the most positive correlation existed between th~ 
dependence on imported Arab oil and vulnerability. to 
pressure during the oil cri.si:s. · The t.wo. classic examples 
here were Japan a.nd the Net:.erlands. Japan, a la!'·ge state 
capitulated very quickly to the Arab oil.-pressur.e. This 
was not too surprisi~g when one considers that Japan 
imports. virtually all of .i.ts oil re.quiremer~t.s. It als-o 
has to be stated that oil pr.ovi.des Japan with ·more tha~n 
three-quarters of the ene~gy used in any of its. varied 
forms - not to mention that it is the basis. upon which a 
very· substantial petro-chemic.al industry has mushroomed to 
international proportions ove~ the yea~s. · .It should b~ 
noted here that although Iran, which did not engage in 
the oil embargo, is Japan's lax>gest single oil supplier -
43 percent in 1971, 1 - the Arab countries supplied 
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approximately the same proportion of Japan's requiremenis. 
In the light of these facts it is easy to see why the 
Japanese autl:.or.iti.es were so alarmed when the prospect for 
an oil short:01ge loomed a.s an i.mnediate threa;t. Their 
reaction was swift. Oil use was .cut back (dim-outs in 
the cities were bro~ght about,. though it was never 
necessary to resort to pa.rt-time worki~g in the factories) 
and new supply sources were sought. Meanwhile,· on th.e 
diplomatic front a quick reversal of position was announced 
in relation to the Arab-Israeli disput:e. This proved 
successful in winning, in late December',' 19.73, the 
reclassification of Japan as a 'friendly' nati.on. In 
resuming good. relations with Japan, .the Arab oil states 
were undoubtedly quite aware of the help they: could expect 
·for their own development ambitions, &s quid pro quo for 
assurances on the supply of oil; sev~eral such under .... 
standi~gs have duly emerge:d4 :2. 
The oil crisis policy of .the Netherlands, a small 
state, provides a marked contrast with Japan. The 
Netherlands was singled out as a collaborator with Israel 
and was subjected. to the extreme Arab oil-pressure, a 
total embargo. The Netherlands imports about 97 percent 
.of its oil, .and by far the largest proportion, 72 'percent, 
3, .comes from the Arab countri.e.s. The Netherlands, 
however, maintained its traditional policy of friendship 
with Israe:l. Superficially at least, it appears as thOugh 
the Netherlands was able to resist the extreme Arab oil-
pressu!"'.e. However, "local Dutch consumption normally 
accounts for no more than about a quarter of the. crude 
(oil) mov::t~g into Rotterdam". 4·. 'I'hus, while the Netherlands 
is still technically a high-level OAPEC oil-importer, only 
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about 24 .. percent of' its oil imports a.re. for direct Dutch. 
consumption. The remaJ.nder is refined, mainly in 
Rotterdam, .and then re-exported. As a result the 
Netherlands has a relatively low direct d.ependence upon 
.OAPEC oi:J.. Where the oil embargo di.d affect the Nether-
lands was in the oil industry's. general contri.buti.on to 
the. country's exports and industrial activity. Overall, 
though, the Netherlands possesses a rather stro~.ger 
bargaining position tho,n i.ni tial appearances might tend to 
indicate, and in fact the Netherlands "is close. to self-
.sufficiency in ene?'.'gy, almost a net .exporter:". 5. · GiVen 
these circumstances, then, it was not surprising that the 
Netherlands was able more easily. to resist the Arab oil-
pres.sure than was a more heavily dependent country such as 
Japan. 
These two examples, allied with the findi~gs of the 
survey of the twenty-six nations, .have led me to 
hypothesize that,. contrary to most small-state theories, 
size was not, and is not, .the key factor determini~g a 
.state's reaction( s) in a crisis situatio.n. ScheTli~g 
&!'gues that "most conflict situations are es.sentially 
ba!'gaini~g situations", 6, .and I believe that one must 
consider the oil crisis (and rr1ost other crises) in this 
manner als:o. As a result I have. formulated an alternative, 
but .still rather tentative, model (F~gure 2}. The· model 
is based on two closely related hypothes~~. The. first 
s:uggests that with an incr.ea.si~g dependence upon Ara.b oi.l 
th~re is a. greater possibility of a large~ shift in policy 
when subjected to pressure from the Arab oil"C'prod.ucer:So 
This is reflected in F~gure 2, ~y the. foreign policy 
shifts of the European countries and Japa,n. This is the 
Figure ~ 
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result of the stro!lg bargaini~,g .position from which the 
·Arab bloc can negotiat:e. The allied hypothesis maintains 
that the lower the dependence on Arab oil, th~ le~s 
likelihood there is of a la~ge shift in policy. This is 
r~flected in Figure 2, by the n~gl~gible foreign policy 
shifts .of the Netherlands, .South Africa, and the. United 
.States as a result of the Arab oil-pr·essur.e. The country 
under pressure has a. greater freedom of ehoice as a. res.ult 
.of the weaker ·Arab ba.rga1ning pos1tion. · The exact 
definition of 'dependence on Arab oil' provide~ an area 
fo~ further research. From my own research it appears 
that a fairly accurate measure of this variable is 
·provided by OAPEC import:s. I have used this calculation 
in F~gure 2, and I have also taken acc.ouht the ·specj.a,l case 
of the Netherlands which re-exports much of its imported 
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OA?EC crude as refined products. 
The model, however, is not an absolute model as the 
plotting of the policy changes made by the countries under 
the Arab oil-pressure shows. There are obviously other 
factors which in certain cases, must also be taken into 
consideration when trying to explain or predict fore~gn 
policy behaviour. As Figure 2 shows, there ~re 
exceptions to the mod~l. Denmark,. for instance, has .not 
made quite as significant a foreign pol~cy shift as one 
might expect from a country with about a 45 per.cent 
reliance on OAPEC oil for· its primary ene?'."gy production. 
However, an additional variable here 1nay well be the fact 
that during the second World War, .Denmark managed to save 
its Jews, a unique. feat in Nazi-occupied Europe. :7. From 
the model Japan appears to have over-reacted somewhat when 
subjected to the Arab oil-pressur.e. However, this is not 
true when one investigates the distribution of oil 
consumption in the Japanese economy • Industry accounts 
. for about 46 percent of Japan's. oil consumption. This is 
a comparatively high proportion (see Table. 20) and, 
because of the essential nature of industry. to the 
Japanese economy, means that Japan has a much lower 'oil 
saving capacity'. A rough asse~sment of a 'tolerable' cut 
in oil supplies would be, for each country: (a) directly 
proportional t6 the share of non-industr~al uses in total 
ene!'gy requirements, .and (b) inversely proportional to the 
share of oil in total primary energy requiremen~s. On 
.thls basis, countries. coutd be ranked accordi~g to the 
following ratio: 8 
non-industrial use of energy 
total use of oil in the economy 
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Table 20. 
DISTRIBUTION OF' OIL CONSUMPTION (%) 
Industry Transport Residential/ Non-
Commercial Energy 
United States 1:4 • ll, 5:2. 9 2:2. 4 1:0. 3 
Japan 46.2 2:1.6 2:3. 2 :9. 0 
·United Kingdom 4:1.1 39.0 1:8 .1 : :T. 8 
.Germany 32.4 25. 7 . 3.4. 2 : :7. 7 
.Italy . 36 .1 . 25.5 2:6. 0 1:2. 4 
Belgium . 35. 8 25.9 2:9. 4 :8. 9 
Netherlands 1.9 .1 4:1 •. 6 2:0.2 1:9 ..• 1 . 
New Zealand . 38. 0 .· 4:7. 0 1.5. 0 
SOURCES: OECD Economj_c Outlook, Decembe·r, .1973, .and 
Hogg, op. ci:t., pp. 90-92 
Table 21 . 
I OIL SAVING CAPACif_I1Y I 
Japan :0. 6 
Italy :0. 7. 
Be ;tgi wn :o·. 8 
United Kingdom :0. 9. 
Gennan;y :i·.·.o 
Netherlands :l.l 
New Zealand :i.·1 ··. 
United States 1. 4. 
SOUHCES: OECD Economic Outlook, ;Dec'ember·, 1973; and 
Hogg, op.ci.t., pp.90~92 
The results in increasi!lg order of 'oil savi!lg 
capacity' are shown in Table 2.1 •. As a reiult Japan 
tended to feel the Arab oil-pressure more ·quickly th.an 
most countries and hence Japan's swift transfer .of 
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diplomatic allegiance. 
Obviously, my model could be refined further but I 
still. feel that it provides a more realistic tool with 
which to explain the. fore~gn policy behaviour of states 
duri0g the oil ·crisis than the small~state theories. ~o. 
I do not deny that a small state may possess a weak 
bargaini?g position, such as that experienced by New 
Zealand during the oil crisis, _but I would deny that a 
small state necessarily finds itself in a weak ba!'gaining 
position compared with a larger stat:e. · In other words, I 
do not .consider that size is the key factor influencing 
fore~gn policy behaviou.r. I believe that, in a conflict 
situation, ba~~gaining .strength is the key. variabl.e. I 
feel that my research has added we~.ght to this hypothesis, 
and syggest that the proposed alternative model may well 
prove a more accurate. guide for the prediction of foreign 
policy behavi.our in any future Arab oil crisis than the 
existing small-state theories provi~e. 
· 1). StrEtegic Survey 1973, (International Institute 
for strategic Studies), p .• 36. 
2). Useful articles on 0 apan and the oil. ·crisis include 
·:n.P.Sinha, 'Japan and the oil crisis', in the World Today, 
A~gust, 197 4, pp .• 335-34·4; 'Japan', in The Australian 
Financial Review, 11 November,,. 197 Lr, pp .15-5·4; 'Japan', a 
special feature in the New Zealand Economist, December, 
1974; and Hartshorn, o_p. ci:t .. , · pp .• 36 3-379. 
3) Strategic Survey 1973, p •. 36. 
4 ). See Hartshorn, op. cit., :p. 36:9. 
· 5) Ibi.d., :p. 36.7. 
6) . :T.Schelli0g, The Strat~gy of Conflict, (New Yo.rk, 
Oxford University Press, .19710 
,....~I 
, 7) Ibrahi.m Sus, 'Western Europe and the October War', 
in Journal of Palestine Studies, no.11~ 1974, p.71. 
8) If: 
NIE ::::; non-industrial use of energy 
TE = total energy requirements 
TO = total oil requirements 
(a) is equal ,_ . NIE GO TE 
(b) is equal t6 TO 
TE 
The amount of 'tolerable' cuts would proportional 
to: 
· :NIE • . ·To =· 'NIE 
TE .- TE TO 
It should be st re:.:: sed that .this is a very rough 
relative indicator of how countries rank in this 
particular aspect, ~ut it can in no way be interpreted 
as an absolute measur:e. 
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APPENDIX 
SECURITY .COUNCIL HESOLUTION, ·22 NOVEMBER 1967, (SC. 242) 
The Security Cotmcil, 
Expressirig its continuing con~ern with the. grave situation 
in the Middle East, · 
Empha,sising the. inadmissibility of the acquisition of 
territory by war and the need to work for a just and 
lasting peace in.which ~very State ~n t~e area.can live 
in security, 
Emphasising further that all Member ·states in .their 
acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have 
undertaken a commit'ment to act in accordance with Article 
2 ~f the -Oharter, 
:lo Affirms that the .fulfilment of Charter 
principles requires the establishment of a just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East which shduld 
inclu~e .the application of both the following 
principles: · 
(.i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces fro_m· 
.territories occupied in_ the recent conflict; 
. . 
(i-i) Termination .of· all claims or states of 
belligerency and respect for and acknowledge 
of .the sovereignty, territorial integrity. and· 
political independence of every State. in the 
area and their right to live in peace within 
'secure and recognised boundaries free from 
threats or acts of force; 
2. Affirms furthe~ th~ nece~sity 
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation 
thr6~gh intern~tional waterways· in the area; 
.(b) For achieving a just settlement of the 
refugee problem; 
(c) For guaranteeing the .territorial inviolability. 
and· political independence of eve~y State in 
the area, th~ough measures including the 
establishment ~f demilitarised zones; 
. :3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a 
Special Representative to proceed to the Middle 
East to establish and maintain contacts. with the 
States concerned in order to promote agreement 
and assist efforts to Achieve a peace~ul and 
accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions 
and principles in this resolution; 
:4. Requests the Secretary-General to ~eport to the 
Security Council on the progress of the efforts of 
the Special Hepresentative as soon as possible. 
